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 VR Acquisitions, LLC (“VRA”) respectfully submits this Supplemental Brief in 
response to the questions the Court posed in its March 10, 2017 Supplemental Briefing 
Order.  
INTRODUCTION 
The questions posed by the Court are difficult, undecided in Utah law and, in 
many respects, unanswered anywhere.  At the end of the day, however, the only question 
the Court must answer is whether the Legislature, in passage of the Public Waters Access 
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-29-101, et seq. (“the “Act”), acted contrary to the 
Constitution.  It did not; it acted consistent with its trust obligations. 
 In considering the issues before the court, it is crucial to recognize that the 
easement defined in Conatser v. Johnson is “corollary” to the public ownership of water 
conceived of under the common law and later codified.  It does not derive from the 
Constitution. It does not derive from an ownership interest in land. 
 A truism often repeated by legal scholars and courts, water is a scarce and 
essential resource in the west. Water is necessary to make the desert bloom both literally, 
through irrigation, and figuratively, through industry and lifestyle. It is for this reason that 
water enjoys different treatment under the law than land – something the west has in 
abundance. Water, unlike land, is not subject to ownership by any individual or the State. 
Title to water cannot be acquired or transferred.  For these very basic reasons, water – 
and the easement corollary to it – are not and cannot be subject to article XX, section 1 of 
the Utah Constitution, the only basis on which the district court invalidated the Act. The 
Court need not go any further as, barring a constitutional restraint, there is no basis on 
which to undo the Legislature’s passage of the Act. 
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This is not to say that the State does not hold the water in trust for the public. To 
do so would be to contradict any number of judicial pronouncements to the contrary. 
Such trust devolves not from the Constitution, however, but from the common law and 
does not provide a basis on which to set aside legislative action.  The Court need not 
wade into these murky waters because the State, in passage of the Act, comported with its 
trust obligations. 
 Inherent in the concept of the public trust is the acknowledgment that the most 
necessary and beneficial uses of water will change over time. As evidenced through the 
evolution of the law governing appropriation, the uses in our state have changed since the 
pioneers arrived in 1847. As society evolved, so too did the public’s use of water. Utahns 
originally used their water for irrigation, mining, and domestic uses. Later, the law 
recognized the need to provide for hydroelectric power and, even more recently, 
recreational purposes.  Not all uses, however, can co-exist with the same integrity. Water 
is a finite resource. Provision for one use necessarily diminishes the availability for 
others. It requires a value judgment. It gives rise to dispute: irrigators versus miners; 
energy providers versus recreators; rafters versus anglers; bait anglers versus fly anglers.   
 The common law and, eventually, the framers of the Constitution provided that 
these disputes were to be resolved by the Legislature as the elected representatives of the 
public. It is the Legislature that can change, and has changed, policy according to the 
evolution of science, industry, and society. The Legislature, as the governing body, is not 
required to promote one use over another. It is required – if anything – to assure that 
water can be put to any necessary and beneficial use that now is needed or might be 
warranted in the future. This is the scope of the State’s trust obligation: assuring that a 
future legislature can reach a different result. As long as the State does not take action 
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that deprives it from acting in what it deems to be appropriate in light of the needs of the 
people at any time, it has complied with its obligations.  
 In management of the water, the Legislature is afforded wide discretion. It is in the 
best position to manage the needs and uses of the people. Unlike a court decision 
enshrining protection for one particular use in the Constitution, the Legislature can weigh 
and prioritize competing uses according to its assessment of the needs and wants of the 
electorate.  But the Legislature does not undertake this task without restriction. 
 As in all matters, the Legislature is bound by the limits imposed on it by the 
Constitution. These include equal protection and due process, among others.  The 
Legislature is also bound to protect other express rights afforded by the Constitution such 
as the prohibition against an uncompensated taking of private property and its general 
obligation to promote public welfare. Barring action that implicates a fundamental right 
or a protected class, the court’s oversight is minimal, examining legislative action for a 
rational relationship to a public purpose.   
 The court’s decision in Conatser flowed from statute that codified common law 
public ownership of water and the legislative recognition of the value of recreational use 
of the waters. The Conatser decision, however, also brought into question the integrity of 
private property underlying non-navigable streams and created discord between 
recreators and landowners.  The Legislature, thus, acted to assure landowners’ right to 
exclude and to reduce conflict between competing factions of the public, both of which 
claimed protection under the Constitution. The Legislature did not, however, deprive a 
future legislature from coming to a different conclusion and expanding the rights of 
recreators so long as it can do so without impinging on any other protected right.  Perhaps 
the Legislature made a mistake and misread the desires of the people. This happens. And 
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when it does, it is the responsibility of the people to elect representatives that will act 
more in accordance with their desires. 
The Court’s role is not that or arbiter of competing uses of the water; it is limited 
to assuring that the Legislature acts in accordance with the restrictions imposed on it by 
the Constitution. Here, the Legislature adhered to its mandate. It did not dispose of any 
interest in land protected by article XX or otherwise clearly and unequivocally violate 
any other provision of the Constitution. It acted in a manner with which some disagree. 
This, however, is not a basis on which to embed the common law public trust doctrine or 
particular uses into the Constitution and invalidate the Act.  
For the reasons set forth herein and in the prior briefing submitted by VRA and the 
State in the above-captioned matter, VRA respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 




1. The public access rights articulated in J.J.N.P.1 and Conatser2 are not “lands 
of the State” that have been “acquired” under article XX, Section 1.3 
In its ultimate conclusion in this matter, the trial court held that the passage of the 
Act violated the state public trust doctrine purportedly embedded in article XX, Section 1 
of the Utah Constitution. It did so based on at least two faulty premises: (1) the easement 
announced fully in Conatser constitutes an interest in “land” which was “acquired” by 
the State; and, (2) the Act effectively “disposed” of that easement in a manner that 
substantially impairs the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining. But what the 
Court has termed the “public access right” to touch privately-owned streambeds attendant 
to use of the water articulated by J.J.N.P. and, later, Conatser, is not an interest in “land” 




                                              
1
 References to “J.J.N.P.” throughout this brief refer to J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, By & 
Through Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982). 
2
 References to “Conatser” throughout this brief refer to Conatser v. Johnson 194 P.3d 
897 (Utah 2008). 
3
 The question posed by the court presupposes that the public trust doctrine is based in 
article XX, section 1. VRA disagrees with this assumption. The public trust doctrine is a 
common law doctrine, not a constitutional mandate. See Robin Kundis Craig, A 
Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private 
Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 Ecology L.Q. 53, 58 
(2010) (“Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law”); 
see also Kootenai Envtl. All., Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 625, 671 
P.2d 1085, 1088 (1983); Hackensack Riverkeeper, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. 
Prot., 443 N.J. Super. 293, 304, 128 A.3d 749, 756 (App. Div. 2015); James L. Huffman, 
Why Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine Is Bad for the Public, 45. ENVTL. L. 337 
(Spring 2015). In any event, VRA submits that the court need not reach this question 
because the Act did not dispose of any public trust resource and thus does not pass the 
threshold test to implicate either article XX or any common law public trust doctrine. 
4
 While the Court has posed the question in terms of “public access” rights, neither 
J.J.N.P. nor Conatser authorized the public to traverse private property to gain access to 
waters in the State. Rather, each addressed use of the water for recreation purposes and 
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As explained more fully in section 1.B, below, in the western United States there 
exists a necessary and fundamental difference between the “water” and “lands.”  This 
principle predates Utah’s statehood, was implicitly and explicitly recognized as Utah 
acceded as a state of the Union, and persists to this day. “Waters” are not “lands.” 
Moreover, and as explained in section 1.C, below, by statute, the “public”, and not the 
“State”, collectively owns the waters. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1. The State holds, but 
does not own, the waters. The State, never having “acquired” the waters in the State also 
never “acquired” the corollary easement for recreational use articulated in J.J.N.P. and 
Conatser. Article XX does not apply. 
A. The “rights” recognized in Conatser and J.J.N.P. arise out of statute, 
legislative policy, and common law. 
That the waters in the State have long been utilized for recreation by the public 
does not mean, of course, that the public always had a “right” to touch the privately-
owned beds of non-navigable streams while doing so.
5
 Both J.J.N.P. and Conatser 
recognized of a public “easement” for use of waters that is “corollary” to public 
ownership of the corpus of the water, an easement that extended to permit the touching of 
private property underlying the waters while recreating. J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136; 
Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 8. Though these “rights” did not materialize from thin air, 
neither were they rooted in the Utah Constitution.  See Brief of Appellant VR 
Acquisitions, LLC (“VRA App. Br.”) at 16–25; Reply Brief of Appellant VR 
Acquisitions, LLC (“VRA Rep. Br.”) at 11–17). Rather, they find their origins in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Conatser extended the recreational easement described in J.J.N.P. to touch the privately-
owned beds of streams while engaged in recreation.  
5




interpretation of statute reflecting common law principles and application of legislatively-
determined policy.   
Utah law – statutory, constitution, and common – makes no mention of any “right” 
to recreate using the waters of the State for nearly the first 100 years of Utah’s statehood 
and for nearly 90 years after the codification of public ownership of the waters.
6
  This 
absence of any pronounced “right” to recreate does not derive from any want for anglers 
or rafters in the State.  Rather, the absence was a result of the value judgments of the 
State acting as trustee over the corpus of the waters in the State. The Utah Legislature, the 
branch of government charged with regulating the use of the waters for the benefit of the 
public, did not, until the late 1970s, officially recognize recreation as a public use to be 
considered in regulation of the waters in the State. 
As the court explained in Little v. Greene & Weed Inv., 839 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 
1992) (emphasis added): 
Since 1888, the right to use water in Utah has been governed by statute.  
See Compiled Laws of Utah 1888, vol. 2, ch. 2.  Early statutes provided 
that water rights became vested upon appropriation to a beneficial use.  Id. 
§ 2870; Revised Statutes of Utah 1898, tit. 33, §§ 1261-62; Bishop v. Duck 
Creek Irrigation Co., 121 Utah 290, 293, 241 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1952). In 
1903, the Legislature codified the application and certification procedures 
for the acquisition of water rights, but preserved the rights acquired through 
earlier appropriations. See 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, §§ 35-45, 72; 
Compiled Laws of Utah 1907 tit. 40. The Legislature also for the first time 
declared all natural waters of the state to be public property. 1903 Utah 
Laws ch. 100, §47; Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (1989). 
It is the Legislature’s statutory declaration of public ownership and the subsequent 
legislative recognition of the relative value of recreational uses of the water that provided 
                                              
6
 As described in prior briefing, the “right” to recreate was absent from common law 
jurisprudence at the time of Utah’s statehood. See VRA Rep. Br. at 11–17. 
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the basis for the court’s first acknowledgment of a recreational easement for use of the 
waters of the State in 1982.  
By statute and according to the intent of the framers of Utah’s Constitution, the 
State Engineer is and has long been tasked with considering appropriation applications 
with an eye toward whether there are other, “more beneficial” uses that might be made of 
the water. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-8, -29. The universe of “more beneficial” 
uses has, over the course of Utah’s history, been determined by the Legislature. Before 
1971, the State Engineer was required to reject any application “where the approval of 
such application would in the opinion of the State Engineer interfere with the more 
beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culinary purposes, stock watering, power or 
mining development, manufacturing, or would prove detrimental to the public welfare 
….” R.S.U. § 100-3-8.  Notably absent from this litany of beneficial uses is any reference 
to recreation. This changed in 1971 when the Legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 73-
3-8 to provide that in evaluating applications for appropriation, the State Engineer was to 
consider recreational uses of the water, as well. In particular, in 1971, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-3-8, the current iteration of R.S.U. § 100-3-8, was amended to state:  
If the state engineer … has reason to believe that an application will 
interfere with the water's more beneficial use for irrigation, municipal and 
industrial, domestic or culinary, stock watering, power or mining 
development, or manufacturing, or will unreasonably affect public 
recreation or the natural stream environment, or will prove detrimental to 
the public welfare, the state engineer shall withhold approval or rejection of 
the application until the state engineer has investigated the matter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (emphasis added). Section 73-3-29, also amended to include 
recreation in 1971, provided that with respect to relocation of streams, the State Engineer 
should consider whether the proposed “change … will unreasonably affect any 
recreational use….”  Utah Code § 73-3-29 (1971). The Legislature made no such mention 
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of recreation when declaring public ownership in 1903; nor did it make any mention of 
recreation in the 1953 version of section 73-3-8.  
Given that the basis for public ownership of water as well as the recognition of 
recreational uses of water are both rooted in statute, not surprisingly the courts in both 
Conatser and J.J.N.P. based their holdings on the statutory declaration of public 
ownership and, as previously briefed, directly tie that principle to the then-current version 
of section 73-1-1 or its 1903 predecessor. See VRA App. Br. at 17; see also Parks v. 
Cooper, 676 N.W. 2d 823, 840 (S. Dak. 2004) (characterizing J.J.N.P. as an exercise in 
statutory interpretation). Specifically and in recognition of its common law roots, J.J.N.P. 
referred to section 73-1-1 as “the doctrine of public ownership.” J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 
1136. 
 Then, acknowledging and applying the Legislature’s recognition of recreational 
uses and ecological concerns, the J.J.N.P. court wrote:  
A corollary of the proposition that the public owns the water is the rule that 
there is a public easement over the water regardless of who owns the water 
beds beneath the water. . . . Furthermore, state policy recognizes an interest 
of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes by 
requiring that recreational uses be considered by the State Engineer before 
he approves an application for appropriation, § 73–3–8, or permits the 
relocation of a stream, § 73–3–29. 
Id. (emphasis added). The J.J.N.P. court referred specifically to Utah code sections 73-3-
8 and 73-3-29, both of which legislatively recognized public recreational interests in the 
waters in the State. The J.J.N.P. court did not cite the Constitution for the doctrine of 
public ownership of waters in the State or even the common law. It referred to statute.
 7
  
                                              
7
 As described at length in prior briefing, and not repeated here, the framers of the Utah 
Constitution expressly rejected the opportunity to constitutionalize public ownership of 
the waters in the State in favor of delegating responsibility of managing water uses to the 
Legislature. See VRA App. Br. at 22-25. 
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Id. The court in Conatser then adopted and applied this statutory basis of the easement, 
extending it to permit the public to touch privately-owned streambeds while recreating 
using the waters in the State. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶¶ 22-25. Conatser characterized 
J.J.N.P. as having “established our own rule” enabling recreation utilizing the waters of 
the State irrespective of the ownership of the beds beneath. Id. at ¶ 19.    
The courts in J.J.N.P. and Conatser both acknowledged and relied on section 73-
1-1 and its proclamation of public ownership of waters in the State. And both courts 
engaged in statutory interpretation to determine whether such public ownership included 
a right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams while recreating in 
light of the Legislature’s identification of recreation as a valid and potentially beneficial 
use of the waters in the State. The “rights” set forth in Conatser and J.J.N.P. stem from 
the statutory recognition of public ownership of waters in the State.   
B. The rights recognized in Conatser and J.J.N.P. are not “lands” within 
the scope of article XX, section 1. 
Article XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, in part:  
[A]ll lands acquired by gift, grant or devise… or that may otherwise be 
acquired, are hereby accepted, and … are declared to be the public lands of 
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people to be disposed of as may 
be provided by law, for the respective purposes for which they have been or 
may be granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired. 
The plain language of this provision makes clear that it applies only to “lands.”  The 
easement recognized in Conatser and J.J.N.P. as a corollary of public ownership of the 
water does not meet this very basic requirement for application of article XX. 
8
  Waters 
are not lands. 
                                              
8
 This issue was first raised in cross-motions for summary judgment in which VRA 
argued, among other things, that article XX did not apply because the Conatser easement 
did not constitute “lands acquired by the State.” (R. 0411; 0703).  The district court 
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In 1848, the United States government acquired control of the lands that would 
become the state of Utah from Mexico pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  In 
the years that followed, as the west was settled, the United States government recognized 
the customary separation of land and waters in the region and sanctioned a system of 
prior appropriation to govern use of water in the west rather than the system of riparian 
rights that had predominated throughout the development of the common law.  
The distinction between water and land was evident in the Mining Act of 1866 as well as 
the Desert Lands Act of 1877, as was explained and confirmed by the United States 
Supreme Court in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Company, 
295 U.S. 142 (1935), authored by Justice Sutherland, a Utah native. In California Oregon 
Power, the Court addressed the question of whether property acquired prior to passage of 
a system of appropriated rights in the Oregon Water Code of 1909 included associated 
riparian rights. The Court concluded that it did not. And in reaching this conclusion, the 
Court traced the history of water in the west and made clear the distinction between 
“land” and “water.” California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 160–65. 
In passage of the Mining Act of 1866, the United States Congress implicitly 
sanctioned the custom of the west in affording rights to the use of waters for mining and 
other beneficial uses according to local rules, including the recognition of rights of the 
first appropriator. California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 154–155. The Mining Act 
provided:  
Whenever by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, 
agricultural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, 
                                                                                                                                                  
concluded that the easement was an interest in land subject to article XX, but that article 
XX was not implicated due to the absence of a “disposition.” (R. 0763). The district court 




and the same are recognized by local customs, laws, and the decisions of 
courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained 
and protected in the same.   
Id. (citation omitted). 
The Desert Lands Act of 1877, allowing for the entry and reclamation of desert 
lands within western States and Territories (including Utah), made a more “positive 
declaration.”  Id.  Specifically, it recognized prior appropriated rights and provided:  
All surplus water over and above such actual appropriation and use, 
together with the water of all lakes, rivers, and other sources of water 
supply upon the public lands and not navigable, shall remain and be held 
free for the appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and 
manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.   
Id. at 156 (quoting Desert Lands Act, c. 107, s 1, 19 Stat. 377 (43 U.S.C.A. §321)).   
The Supreme Court interpreted this statute as severing the land from the water: 
“The fair construction of the provision now under review is that Congress intended to 
establish the rule that for the future the land should be patented separately; and that all 
nonnavigable waters thereon should be reserved for the use of the public under the laws 
of the states and territories named.” Id. at 162. The Court continued that the terms of this 
statute: 
must be read into every patent thereafter issued, with the same force as 
though expressly incorporated therein, with the result that the grantee will 
take the legal title to the land conveyed, and such title, and only such title, 
to the flowing waters thereon as shall be fixed or acknowledged by the 
customs, laws, and judicial decisions of the state of their location. 
Id. at 162. In short, as of 1877, lands of the Western United States were patented as 
estates separate and distinct from the waters that flowed over them. And it was under this 
rubric that Utah became a state. 
The framers of the Utah Constitution, consistent with the Desert Lands Act, 
treated water and lands separately. The question of waters was addressed in the debate 
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surrounding article XVII. In the course of such debate, the framers made clear the 
protection for prior appropriated rights and declined the opportunity to assert ownership 
of the waters in the State. (VRA App. Br. at 24–25). The question of lands was addressed 
in the debate surrounding article XX. In particular, the framers’ discussion focused on 
compliance with the terms of the Enabling Act passed by the United States Congress in 
1894 and its specific grants of land for particular purposes.  See, e.g., Utah Enabling Act, 
ch. 138, §§ 6–8, 12, 28 Stat. 107 (1894); Const. Conv. Proceedings, April 8, 1895 at 808–
809; April 9, 1895 at 813–815; April 19, 1895 at 1206–07; April 30, 1895 at 1686–1703. 
The framers could have dealt with “lands” and “waters” as one. But instead they 
maintained the distinction between title to land and rights to the use of water. And this 
division remains today in Utah law through regulation of water on the basis of 
appropriation rather than title to underlying lands. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-3-1 et seq. 
To conclude that public ownership of the corpus of the water – the foundation for 
the Conatser easement – is the same as “lands” acquired by the State, is to disregard the 
distinction between those concepts that has been inherent in the laws since prior to 
statehood. In the west, acquisition of “lands” does not include any corresponding 
acquisition of “water.”  Article XX, by virtue of its plain language as well as the 
expressed views of the framers, is inapplicable to any easement right attached to the 
“waters” in the State. 
C. The rights recognized in J.J.N.P. and Conatser were not “acquired” by 
the State. 
Article XX of the Utah Constitution applies only to lands “acquired” by the 
“State.”  As discussed in section 1.A, the recreational easement articulated by J.J.N.P. 
and Conatser derives not from “land” ownership but as a corollary to public ownership of 
the waters. This concept of public ownership does not mean, however, that the corpus of 
 14 
1274429.2 
the water has been acquired by the State. The public, collectively, owns the waters; not 
the State. Having never “acquired” the waters, the State also never “acquired” the 
corollary easement for recreational use recognized in J.J.N.P. and Conatser. 
The question of ownership of the corpus of the waters in the state of Utah was 
addressed in Adams v. Portage Irr., Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 653 (Utah 
1937). In describing the distinction between public and private waters, the court wrote of 
public (i.e., unappropriated) waters: “[t]he title thereto is in the public; all are equal 
owners; that is, have coequal rights therein, and one cannot obtain exclusive control 
thereof.”  Id. at 652. This, however, is distinct from the interest of the State. Again 
describing unappropriated waters, the court wrote:  
The title thereto is not subject to private acquisition and barter, even by 
the federal government or the state itself. In the interests of order in the 
social and economic set, rights to the use thereof may be granted to bodies 
or individuals as provided by law, but no title to the corpus of the water 
itself has been or can be granted, while it is naturally flowing, any more 
than it can to the air or the winds or the sunshine.  
Id. at 652–53 (emphasis added). Put another way, the State can neither acquire nor 
dispose of title to the waters in the state. “Water flowing in a natural stream or in a ditch 
is not subject to ownership, so far as the corpus of the water is concerned.” Bear Lake & 
River Waterworks & Irrigation Co. v. Ogden City, 8 Utah 494, 33 P. 135, 136 (1893). 
Utah precedent is clear – no man and no state own the water. This concept is not new; 
rather, it is derived from common law and was embraced by the framers of the Utah 
constitution. 
This common law concept of public ownership dates back to Roman law, 
meandered into English law, and then charted a course to America: “‘[b]y the law of 
nature these things are common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea and 
consequently the shores of the sea.’” Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 
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419, 433–34, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (1983) (quoting Institutes of Justinian  2.1.1)).  “From 
this origin in Roman law, the English common law evolved the concept of the public 
trust, under which the sovereign owns ‘all of its navigable waterways and the lands lying 
beneath them ‘as trustee of a public trust for the benefit of the people.’” Nat'l Audubon 
Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 453 (internal quotations omitted). 
By the common law, both the title and the dominion of the sea, and of rivers and 
arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the lands below high-
water mark, within the jurisdiction of the crown of England, are in the king. Such 
waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide 
is in, are incapable of ordinary and private occupation, cultivation, and 
improvement; and their natural and primary uses are public in their nature, for 
highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the purpose 
of fishing by all the king's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privatum, in such lands, 
as of waste and unoccupied lands, belongs to the king, as the sovereign; and the 
dominion thereof, jus publicum, is vested in him, as the representative of the 
nation and for the public benefit. 
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). In a similar vein, during “the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries, English villages were largely feudal and had “common” land for 
grazing livestock.” Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the 
Attorney General As the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 Duke Envtl. L. & 
Pol'y F. 57, 64 (2005). This concept is, again, consistent with the treatment of water by 
the framers of the Utah Constitution.    
 As discussed in prior briefing, debate on article XVII of the Constitution focused 
on assuring that prior appropriated rights were confirmed. See VRA App. Br. at 24-25.  
In the end, the framers rejected a version of article XVII that declared water to be the 
property of the state; not even the framers understood the state to have acquired the 
corpus of the water. Id. Ultimately, article XVII was limited to confirming existing rights 
to use of waters “in the State….”  Utah Const. art. XVII. 
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The use of the preposition “in” as opposed to “of” is notable.  It signifies that the 
provision pertains to the geographic location of water as opposed to the ownership of 
such water by the State.  This distinction remains today with the current version of Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-1-1: “All waters in this state… are hereby declared to be the property of 
the public….”  
The United States government did not have authority to convey ownership of 
water to the state of Utah. And the Enabling Act made no attempt to do so. See Utah 
Enabling Act, ch. 138, passim, 28 Stat. 107 (1894). Displaying an understanding of this 
limitation, Utah law likewise does not make any claim of State ownership of the waters in 
Utah; rather it recognizes “public” ownership. Because Utah has not acquired title to the 
waters in the State, article XX has no application to the corpus of the water in the State or 
to an easement corollary to ownership of the corpus of that water. 
2. If the Conatser rights qualify as “lands of the State” that have been 
“acquired” by the State, the appropriate standard of scrutiny to apply to the 
Act is rational basis. 
As held by the United States Supreme Court, “following the [Desert Lands] Act of 
1877, if not before, all nonnavigable waters then a part of the public domain became 
publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated states, including those since 
created out of the territories named…” California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 163–64 
(emphasis added). It is through this lens of the State’s plenary authority that the level of 
scrutiny to be applied to State regulation of waters must be considered. While VRA 
contests the premise that the rights described in Conatser constitute lands of the State 
acquired by the State, thereby subjecting them to article XX, if this were the case, the 
passage of the Act must be examined under a rational basis standard.  Lee v. Gaufin, 867 
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P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993); Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U.S. 96, 105 
(1899). 
Utah law provides no apparent guidance as to the level of scrutiny applied to 
challenges asserted under article XX of the Utah Constitution. The Court must therefore 
look for guidance to both the scope of the Legislature’s authority to regulate the waters in 
the State and standards applied thereto under alternative constitutional restrictions. Each 
of these tributaries leads to the conclusion that the Act, should it apply to “lands” 
acquired by the State, must be examined only for a rational basis. 
When determining the constitutionality of a statute in the face of a challenge under 
the uniform operation of laws or equal protection provision, the court considers “(1) what 
classifications the statute creates; (2) whether different classes ... are treated disparately; 
and (3) if there is disparate treatment between classes, whether the legislature had any 
reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.” State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 21, 245 
P.3d 745, 752 (citing State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ¶ 12, 63 P.3d 667) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “On the third point, there are two possible levels of scrutiny—
each involving a three-part analysis.” Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 21 (citing State v. Drej, 2010 
UT 35, ¶ 34, 233 P.3d 476). If “a legislative enactment implicates a fundamental or 
critical right or creates classifications which are considered impermissible or suspect in 
the abstract, [the court] appl[ies] a heightened degree of scrutiny.” Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 
21 (quoting Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89, ¶ 40, 54 P.3d 1069 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Otherwise, the court “employ[s] a rational basis review that involves 
determining (1) whether the classification is reasonable; (2) whether the objectives of the 
legislative action are legitimate, and (3) whether there is a reasonable relationship 
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between the classification and the legislative purpose.” Angilau, 2011 UT 3, ¶ 21, 245 
(internal citations omitted). 
Likewise, determining the constitutionality of a statute in the face of a challenge 
based on “substantive due process analysis under both article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, this court 
applies a rational basis test unless the governmental action implicates a fundamental right 
or interest.” Id. at ¶ 10 (citing State v. Candedo, 2010 UT 32, ¶ 16, 232 P.3d 1008). That 
is, under the due process clause, a statute that does not infringe a fundamental right is 
subject only to rational basis review and will be upheld if it has “‘a reasonable relation to 
a proper legislative purpose, and [is] neither arbitrary nor discriminatory.’” Tindley v. 
Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 2005 UT 30, ¶ 29, 116 P.3d 295, 303 holding modified by Moss 
v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic Comm'n, 2007 UT 99, ¶ 29, 175 P.3d 1042. 
On the level of scrutiny to be applied to regulation of waters in the state, J.J.N.P. 
educates.  The court in J.J.N.P. addressed an equal protection challenge to a statute 
prohibiting the operation of a private fish installation on natural waters and the denial of a 
permit to establish a private fish installation. In so doing, like here, the court was asked to 
assess the propriety of legislation governing the use of natural resources. The court wrote 
that “[a] presumption of constitutionality is extended to statutes …. And that presumption 
is sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of a classification created by statute unless the 
classification creates an invidious distinction or bears no rational relationship to a 
legitimate state purpose.” J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1138.  And, in fact, the “presumption 
requires a court to presume that the classification was intended to further the legislative 
purpose.”  Lee, 867 P.2d at 580.  The United States Supreme Court applied the same 
standard in a challenge to a California statute that limited the vote for the board of 
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directors of a water storage district to landowners.  Sayler Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin 
Water Storage District, 410 U.S. 719, 734 (1973).  
Though no equal protection challenge has been brought in this litigation, the 
general tenets of rational basis review apply. The Act passes muster under this standard. 
In Utah Code section 73-29-103, the Legislature announced a number of legitimate state 
purposes for the Act, including the protection of private property rights under article I, 
section 22 of the Constitution and restoring the harmony between recreators and 
landowners that existed before Conatser. The Legislature declared: 
“(3) whether, or to what extent, a public easement exists for recreational 
use of public waters on private property is uncertain after judicial decisions 
in the cases of J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982) and 
Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008), which decisions did not 
address the constitutional prohibition on taking or damaging private 
property without just compensation; [and] 
… 
(6) its intent to foster restoration of the accommodation existing between 
recreational users and private property owners before the decision in 
Conatser v. Johnson, affirm a floating right recognized by the court in 
J.J.N.P. Co. v. State, and recognize adverse use as a constitutionally sound 
and manageable basis for establishing a limited right of public recreational 
access on private property in accordance with this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-29-103 (3) & (6). Fostering harmony between recreators and 
landowners and protection of constitutional rights epitomizes the Legislature’s duty to 
balance competing interests and serves as legitimate state purpose sufficient to sustain the 
Act. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Utah Alliance to Protect Property Rights at 6–8. 
A. The district court properly considered whether the Act substantially 
impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining. 
The district court concluded that examination of whether the Act violated article 
XX of the Utah Constitution required consideration of whether the Act substantially 
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impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining. (R. 1114–15; 2609).  In 
so doing, the court applied the well-established rule of Illinois Central deemed 
“controlling” by the Court in Colman v. State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990).  
Although VRA contends that the district court should never have reached the question of 
substantial impairment
9
 and although VRA takes issue with the test the district court 
created and its application of that test via article XX, to the extent it was correct in doing 
so, the district court did not err in considering substantial impairment in conjunction with 
applying the common law public trust doctrine, whether grafted on to article XX or 
otherwise.
10
 This is clear from the evolution of the district court’s reasoning during the 
course of litigation and application of Utah precedent authorizing disposition that does 
not result in substantial impairment. 
In its first memorandum decision, the district court grappled with a number of 
issues including (1) whether the Act violated article XX of the Utah Constitution; and (2) 
whether the Act violated what the court termed the “federal public trust doctrine.” (R. 
0760–64). The district court answered both of these questions in the negative. Id. 
In particular, with respect to article XX, the district court held that because the Act 
“did not dispose of all or part of the public’s easement in waters of the State[,]” but 
instead “regulated the lawful use of those waters[,]” the Act did “not implicate the trust 
responsibilities imposed upon the State in article XX, section 1.” (R. 0763).  For the same 
reason, the district court held that the Act did not violate the public trust doctrine. That is, 
                                              
9
 Having concluded that neither article XX nor the “federal public trust doctrine” applies 
for want of a disposition, the district court was obligated to engage in no additional 
analysis. 
10
 The trial court did err in determining that the Act substantially impaired the public’s 
interest in the lands and waters remaining. This issue was addressed in VRA’s prior 
briefs. See VRA App. Br. at 39–48; VRA Rep. Br. at 35–41. 
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because the “Act did not give the public’s easement in State waters without restriction to 
a private party[,]” the “public trust doctrine as defined in Illinois Central R.R. Co. [did] 
not apply.”  (R. 0764).  The district court should have stopped there.  
Surmising that there must be some “state public trust doctrine” but lamenting that 
any such doctrine has “not been well-defined in case law,” the district court requested 
supplemental briefing on, among other things, the purpose of any state public trust 
doctrine and the factors to consider when assessing whether a regulation violated the state 
public trust doctrine. (R. 0766). In making its request, the district court pointed the parties 
to an article entitled A Comparative Guide to the Western States’ Public Trust Doctrines: 
Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward Ecological Public Trust, 37 
Ecology L.Q. 53 (2010). (R. 0767), in which Utah scholar Robin Kundis Craig stated 
unequivocally: “Utah has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine.” Id. at 183. 
Following the supplemental briefing, the district court issued its second 
memorandum decision. Ignoring Professor Craig’s observation, the district court forged 
its own path by essentially grafting the common law public trust doctrine on to article 
XX.  By constitutionalizing the public trust doctrine for the first time in Utah 
jurisprudence, the district court set up its ultimate conclusion.  
In particular, the district court found that a public trust doctrine rooted in article 
XX required consideration of (1) whether the statute regulates interests protected by the 
public trust; (2) whether the public easement was disposed of for the purposes for which 
it was acquired; (3) whether the state has given up its right of control; and (4) whether the 
disposition promoted the interests of the public therein or was accomplished without any 
substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters that remain. (R. 
1111–12). Under this distortion of the Illinois Central test, the trial court concluded that 
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the Act was a regulation “tantamount” to a disposition even though the State had not 
ceded control of the public trust asset and that the Act promoted no public interest. Thus, 
under this newly-minted test to assess this never-before-applied constitutional version of 
the state public trust doctrine, the trial court went on to conduct a trial and ultimately 
found substantial impairment to invalidate the Act under article XX.   
But the district court never should have gotten this far. The court’s conclusion in 
its first memorandum decision that the Act “did not dispose of all or part of the public’s 
easement in waters of the State” should have remained dispositive of any article XX or 
public trust question – just as it was in that first memorandum decision. (R. 0763). To the 
extent the district court correctly concluded that embedded within article XX is a public 
trust obligation that exceeds article XX’s plain language and applies to more than “lands” 
that were “acquired” by the State, however, it was proper for the court to consider 
substantial impairment.  
Article XX of the Utah Constitution provides that lands acquired by the State 
“shall be held in trust for the people, to be disposed of as may be provided by law.” 
(emphasis added). In 1892, before Utah ratified its constitution, the United States 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Illinois Central detailing the rights of the States 
pertinent to lands held in trust for the public. The Court wrote:  
The control of the state for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, 
except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public 
therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the 
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.   
Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,453 (1892) (emphasis added). The Utah 
Supreme Court later described Illinois Central as “controlling” on public trust issues and 
reiterated: “The Supreme Court made clear that a state can grant certain rights in 
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navigable waters if those rights can be disposed of without affecting the public interest 
in what remains.” Colman, 795 P.2d at 635–636 (emphasis added). In other words, the 
State is permitted, “by law” to effectuate dispositions that can be accomplished without 
substantial impairment.   
Accordingly, to the extent the district court properly concluded that common law 
public trust principles inhere in article XX and that the Act is something tantamount to a 
disposition – which conclusions VRA disputes –the district court did not err in opting to 
examine the question of substantial impairment to determine whether the Act was 
permitted by law. Its ultimate conclusion on that front, however, was error. See VRA 
App. Br. at 39-48; VRA Reply Br. at 35-41.  
B. Assuming the Conatser rights constitute “lands” that were “acquired” 
by the State under article XX, section 1, they were not acquired for any 
specific purpose. 
Assuming that the Conatser rights – the rights attendant to an easement to use 
public waters corollary to public ownership of water – were rights acquired under article 
XX, these “rights” would have been acquired for the same purposes as the corpus of the 
water, namely the benefit and the welfare of the people of the State as a whole, but not 
for any particular purpose or use. The Court explained as much in Conatser, quoting, 
among other things, Utah Code section 73-1-1 and J.J.N.P.:  
“By statute, all waters in this state, whether above or under the ground, are 
hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing 
rights to the use thereof. Under this “doctrine of public ownership,” the 
public owns state waters and has an easement over the water regardless of 
who owns the water bed beneath. In granting the public this easement, 
state policy recognizes an interest of the public in the use of state waters 
for recreational purposes. This court has enumerated the specific 
recreational rights that are within the easement's scope. They include the 
right to float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity 
when utilizing that water. 
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Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 8 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In other words, the 
Conatser Easement, to the extent it was acquired under article XX – a premise VRA 
disputes – was acquired for and along with all beneficial uses of the water and to meet the 
needs of the public as those needs change over time. 
  The United States Congress passed the Enabling Act laying the groundwork for 
Utah’s statehood on July 16, 1894. The Enabling Act, presaging article XX of the Utah 
Constitution, provided for certain enumerated lands to be transferred to the State for 
particular purposes. These included school trust lands, lands for erecting public buildings 
in the capital, for the University of Utah, the establishment of a deaf and dumb asylum, a 
miner’s hospital, and a penitentiary, among other things. See Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, 
§§ 6–7, 10–12 , 28 Stat. 107 (1894). Utah law contains no equivalent articulation of the 
“purpose” for which the waters in the state or the “easement” described in Conatser were 
“acquired.”  Instead, it has long been acknowledged that the general concern is one of 
“public welfare” and that the purpose to which waters may or should be put, evolves over 
time. This was made express in J.J.N.P., in which the Court wrote: “Public ownership is 
founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in this area of the 
country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the people; and the State must therefore 
assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the 
people of the State as a whole.”  J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136. 
 In fact, the purpose for which water – or an easement for use of the water – is to be 
utilized cannot be fixed. Such a result would constrain the Legislature from modifying 
the priorities for use of the water in the State as necessary to accommodate societal, 
scientific, and industrial evolution. That is to say, “the concept of beneficial use is not 
static. Rather, it is susceptible to change over time in response to changes in science and 
values associated with water use.” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use All of 
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Water, Both Surface & Underground, Within Drainage Area of Utah Lake & Jordan 
River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete, & Juab Ctys., 2004 UT 67, ¶ 
46, 98 P.3d 1 (citing Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The 
Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 Envtl. L. 919, 942 (1998)). 
‘What is a beneficial use, of course, depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. What may be a reasonable beneficial use, 
where water is present in excess of all needs, would not be a reasonable 
beneficial use in an area of great scarcity and great need. What is a 
beneficial use at one time may, because of changed conditions, become a 
waste of water at a later time.’  
In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use All of Water, 2004 UT 67, ¶ 46 (quoting 
Neuman, Beneficial Use, 28 Envtl. L. at 942 (quoting Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State 
Water Res. Control Bd., 225 Cal. App. 3d 548, 570, 275 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1990) (further 
citation omitted)))).  
A snapshot of our reservoirs, lakes, rivers and streams at any given time would 
illustrate the changing contemporaneous beneficial uses of water. The law, including the 
public trust doctrine has evolved to accommodate these changing values: 
Since the 1970s, states and courts have extended the scope of the doctrine 
to protect other public uses including hunting, boating, swimming, bathing, 
and other recreational activities. Under the influence of changing public 
perceptions, states have applied the public trust doctrine to preserve and 
protect tidelands and other environments that provide food, shelter and 
habitat for birds and marine life and that enhance the scenery and climate of 
certain areas. The geographical reach of the doctrine has also been 
expanded. The public trust doctrine now also encompasses non-navigable 
waters and streams as well as parks, land, wetlands and wildlife. Thus, 
compared to its original scope, the public trust doctrine has been expanded 
considerably. The public trust theory is constantly evolving to address new 
environmental threats and incorporate advances in science. 
Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 57, 82 (citation 
omitted).  Plainly, it is changing needs and uses that undergird the public trust doctrine 
itself. That is, “the legislation which may be needed one day… may be different from the 
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legislation that may be required at another day. Every legislature must, at the time of its 
existence, exercise the power of the state in execution of the trust devolved upon it.”  
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 460. The purpose for which water is managed is not 
immutable akin to the grants of land made according to the Enabling Act, but rather must 
change with the needs and uses of the population.  
C. The Court is not bound by its prior articulation of the scope of rights 
set forth in Conatser. 
i. The Court is not bound by its prior assessment of the scope of rights 
recognized in Conatser and J.J.N.P. 
The Conatser court was charged with determining whether under then-extant law, 
the public had a right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams while 
recreating using waters in the State. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 1. In resolving this 
question, the court relied upon J.J.N.P. and engaged in statutory interpretation to 
determine whether the then-current version of Utah Code section 73-1-1 declaring public 
ownership of the waters sanctioned the plaintiff’s position.  The instant matter presents a 
different question to the Court based on a different statute. 
The Conatser decision and its articulation on the scope of public rights available 
under the 2010 version of section 73-1-1 are not binding on this Court. The statute is 
different. After Conatser, the Legislature modified that statute to provide: “The 
declaration of public ownership of water in Subsection (1) does not create or recognize an 
easement for public recreational use on private property.”  In this respect, the Legislature 
obviated Conatser. The Court is no longer bound by its interpretation of the pre-2010 
version of section 73-1-1. 
The question the Court now seeks to answer is whether the Legislature’s 
amendment of section 73-1-1 and the remainder of the Public Waters Access Act – not 
existent at the time of Conatser – improperly abrogated a constitutional right. This 
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question was not addressed in Conatser. The word “Constitution” does not appear in 
Conatser. Because the questions now facing this Court have not been previously 
resolved, the Court is not bound by its prior delineation of the recreational easement 
announced in the context of the prior version of section 73-1-1. 
ii. Review of the district court’s assessment of rights articulated in 
Conatser is de novo. 
The district court’s assessment of the Conatser rights presents a question of law 
mandating de novo review. Beginning with the premise that, “[b]y statute, ‘all waters in 
this state, whether above or under the ground, are hereby declared to be the property of 
the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof[,]’” the court in Conatser 
engaged in statutory interpretation. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 8; see also VRA App. Br. at 
16–21; VRA Rep. Br. at 17–18. In so doing, the court applied a de novo standard of 
review. Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 10 (“Determining the scope of an easement is a question 
of law. And where issues on appeal are purely legal in nature, we review the district 
court's decision for correctness, without deference.”) (internal citations omitted). 
In this case, the district court assessed the rights articulated by the Utah Supreme 
Court in its interpretation of a statute. “The district court's interpretation of prior 
precedent, statutes, and the common law are questions of law that we review for 
correctness.” Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, ¶ 6, 169 P.3d 441 (citing State v. 
Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1997) (“A lower court's interpretation of binding case 
law presents a question of law which we review for correctness.”)). So, here, where the 
Court is asked to review the district court’s assessment of precedent, the Court engages in 
a de novo review, taking a “fresh look at questions of law decided by a lower court, 
according no deference to its resolution of such issue.” In re Adoption of Baby B., 2012 
UT 35, ¶ 41, 308 P.3d 382. 
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D. The Court must afford substantial deference to the Legislature’s 
judgments about the proper scope of the rights identified in Conatser. 
As previously briefed (and reiterated above), the easement defined by the 
Conatser court was not the product of the Constitution, but of statute and legislative 
policymaking. Accordingly, the Court must afford the Legislature’s judgments about the 
scope of the Conatser rights substantial deference. It is a “well-settled proposition that all 
statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the party challenging a statute bears the 
burden of proving its invalidity.’” Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009 UT 26, ¶ 5, 223 
P.3d 1089 (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah 
1989)). 
In testing the constitutionality of legislation, ... [the Court] construe[s] the 
legislation, to the extent possible, as being in compliance with the federal 
and state constitutions. Given the importance of not intruding into the 
legislative prerogative, we do not strike down legislation unless it clearly 
violates a constitutional provision. We resolve any reasonable doubts 
concerning legislation in favor of constitutionality.  
State v. Herrera, 1999 UT 64, ¶ 18, 993 P.2d 854 (internal citations omitted); see also (R. 
0735) (“Every reasonable presumption and every reasonable doubt must be resolved in 
favor of constitutionality.”) (citing Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 
Utah 2d 431, 446 P.2d 958, 961-62 (Utah 1968)).
11
  
In the words of the district court, “[a]s the branch of government responsible for 
policy-making, the Legislature is in the best position to weigh the competing interests in 
Utah’s natural waters, and to regulate the scope of the public’s use.” (R. 0759). In this 
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 Utah Tech. Fin. Corp. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406, 412 (Utah 1986) (internal quotations 
omitted) (“Due respect for the legislative prerogative in law making requires that the 
judiciary not interfere with enactments of the Legislature where disagreement is founded 
only on policy considerations and the legislative scheme employs reasonable means to 




regard, the district court recognized that “[a] future Legislature may strike a different 
balance between public recreational users and private land owners.” (Id.); see also Nat'l 
Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 923 (Utah 1993), 
(Durham, J., concurring) (“A state can never have “undivided loyalty” to a single interest 
group; it must consider the health, safety, and welfare of all its people. It also has the duty 
to manage and preserve public lands for the benefit of present and future generations.”). 
There is a presumption that in balancing these often competing interests, the Legislature 
acts for the benefit of the people, and not to serve private interests. 
Of course, at times it may be difficult for competing uses to coexist. As USAC 
offered at trial, its angling members on the Provo and Weber rivers have been frustrated 
on more than one occasion by other recreating members of the public who were tubing 
and scaring the fish. (R. 2951; 2973–80; 2976; 3055–61; 3230). Yet both uses are 
contemplated by the Conatser Easement. The Legislature, then, is charged with 
regulating the public’s use of the water, including the kind of competing sues USAC’s 
members find frustrating. “Some public uses must yield if other public uses are to exist at 
all. The uses must be balanced and accommodated on a case by case basis.” State v. Vill. 
of Lake Delton, 286 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).  And, ultimately, it is the 
Legislature, and not the courts, that shoulders the responsibility to determine whether one 
particular need or use predominates over others in light of the circumstances of the day.   
3. If the Conatser rights do not qualify as “lands of the State” or have not been 
“acquired” by the State, the Legislature’s authority remains limited by more 
generally applicable constitutional restraints as well as by its accountability to 
the public.    
It has long been the case that the Legislature is vested with substantial authority 
and discretion in matters of government and policy. Stated another way, 
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It is a truism recognized by all the authorities that the Legislature of a state 
is vested with the whole of the legislative power of the state and may deal 
in any subject within the scope of constitutional government except as such 
power is limited or directed by express provision of the Constitution or 
necessary implication arising therefrom. 
 Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P.2d 530, 535, 87 Utah 237 (1935).  The Legislature enjoys the 
same authority and discretion in its regulation of use of the waters in the State. The 
United States Supreme Court long ago made clear that nonnavigable waters (like those at 
issue in this case) are “subject to the plenary control of the designated states, including 
those since created out of the territories named….”  California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. 
at 163–64.  And it is the Legislature that has the power to act “in respect of waters and 
water rights as they deem wise in the public interest.” Id at 163. This power, however, is 
not without its limitations, irrespective of the application of article XX of the 
Constitution. The Legislature is limited in at least two fundamental ways: (1) by express 
Constitutional restrictions on legislative action; and (2) by the nature of its obligations 
and the political consequences of defying the will of the majority.   
First, the Constitution forms the parameters of the Legislature’s ability to legislate. 
The Constitution has long been characterized as establishing “limitations, and not grants 
of powers.”  Lehi City, 48 P.2d at 535 (quotation omitted).  By way of example, article 
XX, section 2 limits legislative disposition of school trust lands. While this restriction 
and that contained in article XX, section 1 –  as discussed in Section 1, above, – are 
inapplicable to the easement at issue here, the Legislature’s authority to manage the 
waters in the State, including the easement articulated by J.J.N.P. and Conatser is, in fact 
limited by more generally applied and well-established constraints plain on the face of 
the Constitution including due process, equal protection/uniform application of laws, and 
the prohibition against private laws. See, e.g., Whitmer v. City of Lindon, 943 P.2d 226, 
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228 (Utah 1997); Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 934 (Utah 
1993); J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137 (Utah 1982); Lehi City, 48 P.2d at 536; Eden Irr. Co. v. 
Dist. Court of Weber Cty., 61 Utah 103, 211 P. 957, 959 (1922). Each of these provisions 
governs the manner in which the Legislature can exercise its authority to regulate use of 
the waters of the state.    
Similarly, the Legislature is bound by the Constitution in its duty to protect of 
other recognized and established rights. By way of example, it cannot regulate the use of 
water in such a manner that gives rise to an uncompensated taking of private property 
prohibited by article I, Section 22. To be sure, this concern led to passage of the Act. As 
noted above and in prior briefing, the Conatser court in 2008, interpreted statute to allow 
the public to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams. Conatser, 2008 
UT 48, ¶ 8. In passing the Act in 2010, the Legislature made clear that it was attempting 
to avoid improper takings. In certain “Declarations” passed with the Act, the Legislature 
invoked the protections of article I, section 22 and made clear its objective to balance 
public use of the resources in the State with those property rights specified in the 
Constitution.  Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-29-103 (3) & (6). 
Second, the Legislature is limited by the scope of its responsibility and its 
accountability to the public at large. Broadly stated, the  Legislature is generally charged 
with “allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of the State as a 
whole.” J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136; see also HEAL Utah v. Kane County Water 
Conservancy Distr., 2016 UT App 153, ¶ 5, 378 P.3d 1246.  It is the power of the State to 
“legislate in respect of waters and water rights as they deem wise in the public interest.” 
California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 163. In so doing, the Legislature must be mindful 
of the changing societal values. 
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As discussed in Section 2.B., above, the “beneficial use” of water is a “flexible 
concept, changing over time to accommodate developments in thinking about water use, 
such as changes in science and values.” In re Gen. Determination of Rights to Use All of 
Water, 2004 UT 67, ¶ 46 (quoting Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, 28 Envtl. L. at 946).  
In 1877, the uses that predominated were for “irrigation, mining and manufacturing….”  
California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 156 (internal quotation omitted).  These have 
changed over time.  Mining is no longer the juggernaut of Utah’s economy. In contrast, 
unmentioned in the law at the time of the Constitution, recreation now occupies a more 
prominent space in the public uses of the waters – and the lands – in Utah. And, 
consistent with its charge, the Legislature recognized as much in 1971 with the 
amendments to Utah Code §§ 73-3-8 and 73-3-29.  
But public views differ on the highest and best use of the water – irrigation versus 
recreation versus industry, for example. Even within recreation, discord exists between 
floaters and anglers. (R. 2973–80; 2976; 3055–61; 3230). Discord even exists between 
fly fishing and bait fishing. (R. 2951; 3055–61; 3357). Nevertheless, the Legislature, 
managing the water for “the people of the State as a whole,” must make determinations 
prioritizing one use over another. A policy determination in favor of recreation may anger 
irrigators and ranchers while pleasing the outdoor consumer industry. Alternatively, the 
State’s tourist and retail industry may suffer for the Legislature’s adoption of policy 
favoring landowners and energy suppliers. As a result of our form of government, 
however, the Legislature does not do this in isolation.  It is, in fact, accountable to the 
public for its value judgments. If the Legislature fails to act in a manner consistent with 
the direction and desires of the public, it does so at its peril. The public has a right and an 
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obligation to voice whether it disagrees with the Legislature. And if the Legislature does 
not listen, it can and will be replaced. 
This is the most fundamental limit on the Legislature’s authority – the public 
itself.  If the Legislature misapprehends or acts contrary to the will of the majority, the 
people can elect a different Legislature more attuned to their needs. As astutely put by the 
district court, in its second summary judgment order: “the remedy for short-term special 
interests misusing legislative processes is for majorities to organize and participate fully 
in representative government.  That political remedy exercised by the generation of today 
is the best hope for responsible stewardship of public wilderness and waters.” (R. 1107). 
A. The State’s trust duties with respect the use of the corpus of the water 
arise from the common law. 
As one scholar noted, “[t]he origins of the modern public trust doctrine thesis lie 
in the notion of ‘sovereign capacity’ ownership.” Richard J. Lazarus, Changing 
Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public 
Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631, 637 (1986). Stated otherwise, “[t]he doctrine of 
public ownership is the basis upon which the State regulates the use of water for the 
benefit and wellbeing of the people.” J.J.N.P, 655 P.2d at 1136. This doctrine of public 
ownership and the sovereign’s role in holding public assets arise from common law. See 
Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 411 (1842) (“The dominion and 
property in navigable waters, and in the lands under them, [are] held by the king as a 
public trust ... for the common benefit. In such cases, whatever does not pass by the grant, 
still remains in the crown for the benefit and advantage of the whole community.”).12  
                                              
12
 “Generally speaking, the law of water allocation in the United States is state law, based 
on both the state sovereign ownership doctrine and the public trust doctrine. These 
doctrines are closely associated,
 
and both were inherited from the English common law, 
in which the monarch held title to certain natural resources for the common benefit. 
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  As set forth in Section 1.C, above, “[w]ater flowing in a natural stream or in a 
ditch is not subject to ownership, so far as the corpus of the water is concerned.” Bear 
Lake & River Waterworks & Irrigation Co., 33 P. at 136. Concomitant to the concept of 
common ownership was the concept of regulation. This is evident from Roman law and 
English law and is present today:  “modern notions of property emerged, these goods and 
advantages became the property of the state held for the benefit of all. Finally, the rights-
based notion grew to encompass various public responsibilities.” Kanner, The Public 
Trust Doctrine, 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 57, 64–65. 
Even from the beginning, the use of the commons was regulated: The 
villages determined the type and number of animals permitted in the 
commons, the time of year they could be loose, how long they might graze, 
and when they must be removed. 
Id. “[A]lthough they changed its beneficiary from the monarchy to the public as a 
whole[,]” the colonists brought the concept of public ownership and sovereign regulation 
to America. Id. at 66. This common law doctrine provides the foundation for the State’s 
trust duties.   
In the words of the trial court, citing J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136: “Public ownership 
of waters in the State does not eliminate the Legislature's authority to regulate use of 
those waters. Indeed, the doctrine of public ownership is the basis for the legislature's 
regulatory authority.” (R. 0749).  This long-repeated maxim that the state holds the water 
in trust for the benefit of the public is a product of common law that has found a place in 
statute. See Murphy v. Kerr, 296 F. 536, 540 (D.N.M. 1923), aff'd, 5 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Under the state sovereign ownership doctrine, the state governments assumed the role of 
the sovereign when they declared independence from the crown, giving them title to 
sovereign lands and waters.” Logan Starr, The High Court Wades into State-Law Water 




1925) (“Water running in a natural stream belongs to the public. By statutory enactment 
… Utah … ha[s]declared in substance that all waters within the state are the property of 
the public, or belong to the state. The modern expression is that such waters are owned by 
the state in trust for the people.”); see also Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to 
the Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the 
Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust, 37 Ecology L.Q. 53, 79 (2010) (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 and quoting J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136) (“Under Utah's 
statutes, waters are owned by the public, and the Utah Supreme Court has tied the need 
for public rights to water scarcity: water is ‘a scarce and essential resource in this area of 
the country’ that ‘is indispensable to the welfare of all people; and the State must 
therefore assume the responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and 
welfare of the people of the State as a whole.’”). As such, the State’s duties as trustee are 
the product of common law.  
i. Assuming the State acts as trustee for the waters in the State, these 
duties apply to any and all uses of the corpus of the water. 
“The State, acting as trustee rather than owner, has assumed the responsibility of 
allocating the use of the water for the benefit and welfare of all the people.” In re Uintah 
Basin, 2006 UT 19, ¶¶ 34, 133 P.3d 410 abrogated on other grounds by Energy Claims 
Ltd. v. Catalyst Inv. Grp. Ltd., 2014 UT 13, ¶¶ 34-35, 325 P.3d 70 (citing J.J.N.P., 655 
P.2d at 1136). Conatser and J.J.N.P. concluded that recreational uses of the water were 
“corollary” to the doctrine of public ownership codified at Utah Code section 73-1-1.  As 
a result, like all uses of the water in the State, recreational uses are within the scope of the 
trust under which the State holds the water for the public. But this does not place 
recreational uses on a pedestal over all other uses; rather they fall within the general 
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responsibility of the State to manage all of the waters for all of the people considering all 
competing, available, and lawful uses of the water. 
 Because “[b]eneficial use … chang[es] over time to accommodate developments 
in thinking about water use, such as changes in science and values….”, no one use – or 
any use – may be elevated to the detriment of all others. In re Gen. Determination of 
Rights to Use All of Water, 2004 UT 67, ¶ 46 (quoting Neuman, Beneficial Use, 28 Envtl. 
L. at 946).
13
  Utah law, both in case law and statute, exemplifies the evolving and myriad 
uses for which the waters in the State are to be managed. The Mining Act of 1866 and the 
Desert Lands Act of 1877 focused on necessary uses of water associated with the 
settlement of the American west – irrigation, mining, and manufacturing.  Later, in 1943, 
the Court in Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957, 961 (1943), identified 
beneficial uses of the water as: “domestic, culinary and irrigation purposes, and for the 
generation of electric power.” And in 1971, the Legislature recognized the value and 
existence of recreational uses. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8 (1971); see also Nat'l Parks & 
Conservation Ass'n, 869 P.2d at 919 (identifying public trust duty to protect “ecological 
integrity of public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at 
large.”). The uses of water are fluid, depending on the evolution of science, industry and, 
generally, the needs of the public.   
Accordingly, the State exercises its trust duties with respect to any use the public 
makes of the corpus of the water, taking into consideration all then-extant beneficial uses 
of the water, including the uses set forth in Conatser  and J.J.N.P.  This trust, however, 
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does not require the promotion of recreational uses or imbue recreational uses with more 
or less integrity than any other use.  
ii. Assuming the State acts as trustee for the waters in the State, the 
State has broad authority regulate use of the water for the benefit of 
the public. 
a) The scope of the State’s trust duties is to ensure a future 
legislature may regulate waters according to the changing 
demands of the public. 
Generally stated, it is the responsibility of the State to manage the waters in the 
state to serve the public welfare. “The doctrine of public ownership is the basis upon 
which the State regulates the use of water for the benefit and well-being of the people.” 
J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136. This does not mean, and cannot mean, that the State is 
obligated to provide for or accommodate any particular use of the water. The State must 
act in the public interest. California Oregon Power, 295 U.S. at 163. And the State must 
ensure that future legislatures retain the ability to act in the public interest.
 14
  
 Even before Utah’s statehood, water enjoyed a well-established position as a 
valuable commodity in the deserts of the American west. Over time, the uses of water 
have evolved. Mining no longer holds the same place in our economy it once did. At the 
time of statehood, irrigation did not mean providing for a verdant front lawn or a stream 
through a mall. The needs and wants of the public evolved and will continue to evolve.  It 
is the purpose of the public trust to assure that the Legislature retains the ability to modify 
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 Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, 16 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 57, 76 (internal 
quotations omitted) (“Public trust resources are protected by the trust against unfair 
dealing and dissipation, which is classical trust language suggesting the necessity for 
procedural correctness and substantive care. . . . The public trust doctrine demands fair 
procedures, decisions that are justified, and results that are consistent with protection and 





the hierarchy of water uses to comport with the needs of the people at any given time. 
This was made express in Illinois Central, where the Supreme Court articulated the 
importance of the public trust as follows: 
 
The legislature could not give away or sell the discretion of its successors 
in respect to matter, the government of which, from the very nature of 
things, must vary with varying circumstances. The legislation which may 
be needed one day… may be different from the legislation that may be 
required at another day. Every legislature must, at the time of its existence, 
exercise the power of the state in execution of the trust devolved upon it.    
Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 460.  Stated another way, the public trust is concerned not 
with mandating any particular action or use of the waters of the State, but with assuring 
that the waters are preserved and available for any public use a future legislature may 
deem necessary or beneficial. The trust duties on the State prohibit the State from 
alienating the trust resource to the point where the resource incurs irreparable substantial 
impairment, thereby hamstringing any future legislature.  
At the end of the day, whether the Legislature has comported with its trust 
responsibilities is really a question of whether Legislature has taken any action that 
prevents a future legislature from reaching a different conclusion as to what is best for the 
public in light of societal and environmental circumstances. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 
460. As long as that question can be answered in the negative – as long as the Legislature 
has preserved its ability to reach a different conclusion based upon the will of the people 
– the Legislature has fulfilled its duties.  
Here, the Legislature has not divested its successors of the means to legislate 
according to the will of the people. And, in fact, it likely cannot do so. That is, the public 
ownership of the water remains.
 15
  A future legislature has the ability to re-define and re-
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 As discussed above, the State does not have the authority to transfer title to the water; it 
can only regulate its use. As a result, any attempt to deprive of the public of its ownership 
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prioritize the appropriate scope of the public’s use of the waters of the state. It could 
emphasize technological development, or irrigation, or mining, or recreation. It could 
recognize a change in climate and divert more water for consumption or eliminate certain 
recreational opportunities in order to build a hydroelectric dam. It could, if reconcilable 
with the Constitution’s protection for private property rights, expand the public’s use of 
the waters. But it may not inhibit the prospects of its successor legislature.  
b) The Court determines whether the Legislature has breached 
its trust obligations by evaluating whether it has precluded the 
Legislature from acting according to the will of the people. 
As set forth above, the State’s trust responsibilities require it to assure that the 
Legislature can act as it deems necessary in the future. These general trust responsibilities 
do not require the Court to assess the wisdom of legislative policy making, but only 
whether the State has rendered it impossible to provide for a different policy at a different 
time. 
The legislature presumptively acts for the benefit of the public, “with the purpose 
of promoting the interests of the people as a whole ….” Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 174 
U.S. at 104.  Stated differently, “[t]here is a strong presumption that a Legislature 
understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are 
directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based 
upon adequate grounds.” Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 521 (1922) (internal 
quotation omitted).  “[I]t is conclusively presumed a legislature acts only in the ‘public 
                                                                                                                                                  
of the waters in the state, would be ultra vires and subject to challenge. See Weese v. 
Davis Cty. Comm'n, 834 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah 1992). Similarly, any transfer of the lands 
underlying navigable waters, designated as sovereign lands of the State, and acquired 
under the equal footing doctrine, would invoke the protections of article XX. Utah Code 
Ann. § 65A-1-1. The State can never permanently deprive the public of the potential for 
recreational use of the navigable waters in the state – including the touching of the beds.   
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interest’....” Utah Light & Traction Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 118 P.2d 683, 696 (Utah 
1941).   Thus, “courts will not lightly hold that an act duly passed by the legislature was 
one in the enactment of which it has transcended its power.”  Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co., 
174 U.S. at 104.   
As one authority observed: 
[I]t is virtually unheard of for a court to rule directly that a policy is illegal 
because it is unwise; the courts are both too sophisticated and too restrained 
to adopt such a procedure. Rather they may effectively overrule a 
questionable policy decision by requiring that the appropriate agency 
provide further justification; alternatively, the courts may, in effect, remand 
the matter for additional consideration in the political sphere . . . .  
Joseph Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471, 558 (1969–70). “The 
judge, in other words, is not a primary lawgiver but instead an agent for the legislature or 
framer that played that role.” State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 31, 267 P.3d 210.  This is a 
conscious allocation of power. “The more politically accountable bodies of government 
make new laws; judges, who are more insulated from political processes, simply interpret 
them and attempt to apply them in an objective, evenhanded manner.” Id.  
The Court is not required to determine whether the Legislature has made an 
appropriate determination of how water is regulated or whether one use or another should 
be prioritized or accommodated at all. As is made clear in the plain language of article 
XX, section 1, and also in Illinois Central, the Court’s role is to assure that property held 
in trust for the people is not disposed of. That is all. It need not make value judgments 
about the wisdom of regulation or the Legislature’s priority of uses. It is the Legislature’s 
responsibility to make these determinations. And if the Legislature misjudges the value of 
one use over another, it runs the risk that the public disagrees and determines that new 
management is in order.  If the Court, however, misjudges and embeds in the 
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Constitution protection for one use over the other or requires the Legislature to promote 
and protect any particular use it is, in effect, doing exactly what the public trust is 
intended to prohibit: it is, preventing a future legislature from acting as may be necessary 
in the future to the extent it conflicts with what the Court deems important today.    
In regulating the public trust asset – the corpus of the water – the Legislature did 
not act contrary to its responsibility as trustee over the corpus of the water. Regulation of 
water rights is not only permissible in Utah, but it is a result of public ownership itself.  
“Indeed, the doctrine of public ownership is the basis for the legislature’s regulatory 
authority.” (R. 0749).  Here, the State determined to avoid contention of an 
uncompensated taking by landowners and moderate the tensions between landowners and 
recreators through limits to use of waters flowing over private property. Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 73-29-103 (3) & (6).  It did not take away the right to recreate. It left over 12,700 
miles of streams, and 3,600 miles of fishable stream flowing over public property open to 
the public. (R. 2609; 2612).  It allowed the public to float any river or stream capable of 
being floated.  Utah Code Ann. § 73-29-202. Perhaps most importantly, it left the 
possibility of a future legislature to reach a different conclusion in the event the public, 
the economy, industry, or science, warrants a different treatment.   
c) The Court should employ a rational basis review to evaluate 
the State’s compliance with its trust duties. 
The level of scrutiny a court employs when reviewing a challenge to state action 
will vary depending on the nature of the challenge, but will most often be rational basis. 
This standard is discussed in Section 2, above, and is not reiterated, here. Accordingly, 
absent implication of a fundamental right or disparate treatment of a protected class, the 
Court engages in rational basis review when evaluating a constitutional challenge to 
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legislative action. Because neither protected class nor fundamental right is implicated 
here, rational basis applies.  
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth herein as well as in the prior briefing of VRA and the 
State of Utah in the above-captioned appeal, VRA respectfully requests that the Court 
reverse the judgment of the district court and direct judgment in favor of VRA and the 
State. 
DATED this 1st day of May, 2017. 
 
       JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH, P.C. 
 
By:         
 Eric P. Lee 
 Nathan D. Thomas 
 Elizabeth M. Butler  






CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Utah R. App. P. 
24(g)(5)(C) because this brief contains 13,942 words, excluding the parts of the brief 
exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(1)(B). 
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b) 
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Times 




day of May, 2017. 
     JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
 
By:/s/ Nathan D. Thomas 
 Eric P. Lee 
 Nathan D. Thomas 
 Elizabeth M. Butler  





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of May, 2017, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing to be served via United States Mail and electronic mail on 
the following:  
 
Craig C. Coburn 
Richards Brandt Miller Nelson 
299 South Main Street, 15
th
 Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Craig-Coburn@rbmn.com 
 
John L. Young 
YOUNG HOFFMAN, LLC 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1125 
Salt Lake City, UT   84101 
jlyoung@yahlaw.com 
 
W. Cullen Battle 
Fabian VanCott 
215 South State, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
cbattle@fabianvancott.com 
 
Thomas D. Roberts 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5
th
 Floor 
PO Box 140857 




Stanford E. Purser 
Civil Appeals Division 
160 East 300 South, 5
th
 Floor 
PO Box 140858 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0858 
spurser@utah.gov 
 
Michael D. Zimmerman 
John Hurst 
Zimmerman Jones Booher 
Felt Building, Fourth Floor 
341 South Main Street 























Appendix of Exhibits 
 
Exhibit A: Excerpts of Brief of Appellee VR Acquisitions, LLC  
 
Exhibit B: Excerpts from Reply Brief of Appellee Cross-Appellant VR 
Acquisitions, LLC 
 
Exhibit C: Excerpts from the Record 
 
Exhibit D: Excerpts from the Brief of Amicus Curiae Utah Alliance to Protect 
Property Rights 
 











IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
 
 
UTAH STREAM ACCESS COALITION, a  






VR ACQUISITIONS LLC, a Delaware 
























BRIEF OF APPELLANT VR ACQUISITIONS, LLC 
 
Appeal from the Fourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch County, 
Honorable Derek Pullan, Judge 
Case No. 100500558 
 
 
Craig C. Coburn 
Richards Brandt Miller Nelson 
299 South Main Street, 15
th
 Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
 
John L. Young 
Young Hoffman, LLC 
170 S. Main Street, Suite 1125 
Salt Lake City, UT   84101 
 
W. Cullen Battle 
Fabian VanCott 
215 South State Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 




Thomas D. Roberts 
Stanford E. Purser 
Office of the Utah Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5
th
 Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0857 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant State 
of Utah 
 
Eric P. Lee (USB #4870) 
Nathan D. Thomas (USB #11965) 
Elizabeth M. Butler (USB #13658)  
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah  84101 




the fact that USAC: (a) failed to present evidence of impairment of the right to use the 
water “remaining”; (b) failed to demonstrate what percentage of the waters of the State 
are actually off-limits to public recreational use; and (c) failed to present evidence as to 
any recreational activity other than fishing on streams.  It is not known how many miles 
are off-limits to anglers, birdwatchers, hunters, or any other member of the public.  It is 
unknown whether or to what extent the public’s recreation interest at large was actually 
impaired.    
The trial court improperly expanded the scope of the Utah Constitution.  The trial 
court found in Article XVII a right to recreate using the waters of the public not intended 
by the framers of the Constitution.  The trial court extended the public trust principles of 
Article XX beyond the lands held in trust for the public and embedded in that provision 
an unworkable test that hinders rather than promotes the legislature’s ability to regulate 
public lands and resources.  The trial court divested the legislature of its authority and 
duty to manage the lands and resources of the State consistent with the wishes of the 
electorate.  By its ruling, the trial court caused the harm intended to be avoided by the 
public trust doctrine.  For these reasons, the trial court’s decision must be reversed and 
judgment entered in favor of the State and VRA.    
VII. Argument 
A. Article XVII Did Not Recognize the Conatser Easement. 
Article XVII of the Constitution provides: “All existing rights to the use of any of 
the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and 
confirmed.”  Early on, the trial court sought to determine whether the Conatser Easement 
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was among those rights recognized and confirmed by Article XVII.  The trial court 
erroneously answered this question in the affirmative on the basis of Conatser v. 
Johnson, 2008 UT 48, 194 P.3d 897 (“Conatser”), J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133 
(Utah 1982) (“J.J.N.P.”), and  Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power, 72 P.2d 
648, 653–54 (Utah 1937) (“Adams”).  It concluded that, as a corollary of public 
ownership of water, the Conatser Easement was rooted in the Constitution. (R.0748). 
This conclusion – the foundation of all trial court rulings – is incorrect.  
1. The Conatser decision did not root a recreational 
easement in the Constitution. 
The Conatser Court grappled with whether the public possessed an easement 
allowing it to traverse privately-owned streambeds for recreational purposes.  In 
answering this question, the Court relied not on the Constitution, but on Utah Code Ann. 
§ 73-1-1.  The Conatser Court began its analysis stating that “[b]y statute, ‘[a]ll waters in 
this state, whether above or under the ground, are hereby declared to be the property of 
the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof.’”  Conatser, 2008 UT at ¶ 8 
(quoting Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added)).  Interpreting this 
statute, the Court stated, “the public owns state waters and has an ‘easement over the 
water regardless of who owns the water bed beneath.’” Id. (quoting J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 
1136).  The Court, quoting J.J.N.P., concluded that because the easement provides the 
right to recreate “when utilizing” water, the easement permits the public to walk down 
privately-owned streambeds.  Id. at ¶ 14.   
In J.J.N.P., the Court similarly engaged in statutory, and not constitutional, 
interpretation.  It quoted Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 for the proposition that “all waters in 
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this state . . . are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing 
rights to the use thereof.”  655 P.2d at 1136.  The J.J.N.P. Court went on to note “the 
public does not trespass when upon such waters.”  Id. (citing Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 
137 (Wyo. 1961) (emphasis added)).  The Court reasoned that this easement permits the 
public to perform lawful recreational activities when “utilizing [the] water.”  Id. at 1136–
37 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-8; Day, 362 P.2d 137).  Thus, in J.J.N.P. where a 
landowner sought a fish installation in a lake fully enclosed on private land, the Court 
found that the public, via its easement under Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1, had recreational 
interests in the water permitting the State to prohibit the fish installation.  J.J.N.P., 655 
P.2d at 1135–37.  The J.J.N.P. Court neither made any decision related to the lakebed nor 
constitutionalized a recreational easement.  See, e.g., id.  
Notwithstanding the Utah Supreme Court’s citation to statute to support its 
holdings in both Conatser and J.J.N.P., the trial court pronounced the Conatser Easement 
a constitutional right relying upon the statement from Adams that: “. . . while water is still 
in the public, everyone may drink or dip therefrom or water his animals therein, . . . .  
This right of the public, as well as the rights of the appropriator were confirmed by the 
State Constitution in [A]rticle [XVII] . . . .”  Adams, 72 P.2d at 653; (R. 0743).  This 
flowery language fails to cloak the Conatser Easement with constitutional protection.  A 
closer read of Adams shows that the Court was concerned with consumption not 
recreation, let alone the use of the privately-owned streambeds beneath the water.  
Adams, 72 P.2d at 652–53. 
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Other cases citing Article XVII, similarly center on consumptive uses such as 
irrigation, mining and manufacturing rather than recreation.  In Whitmore v. Salt Lake 
City, 57 P.2d 726, 731 (Utah 1936), the Court cited Article XVII in determining that 
water could be appropriated for power purposes from a stream that ran through private 
property.  In Chandler v. Utah Copper Co., the Court noted that Article XVII of the 
Constitution protected prior appropriators.  135 P. 106, 109 (Utah 1913); see also Snake 
Creek Mining & Tunnel Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., 260 U.S. 596 (1923); Hanson v. Salt 
Lake City, 205 P.2d 255 (Utah 1949); Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 289 P. 
116, 117 (Utah 1930); Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 164 P. 856, 857 
(Utah 1916); Cole v. Richards Irr. Co., 75 P. 376 (Utah 1904).   
The case law addressing Article XVII and pre-dating Conatser focuses almost 
exclusively on consumptive and appropriated uses of water and does not recognize 
Article XVII as protecting any public recreational easement over streambeds or 
confirming public ownership of the waters.  Using waters for recreation did not arise in 
Utah jurisprudence until J.J.N.P. and Conatser.  And both J.J.N.P. and Conatser ground 
recreational rights in Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1, not Article XVII.   
In “the absence of any constitutional restraint . . . the legislature may act upon any 
subject within the sphere of government.”  Kimball v. City of Grantsville City, 57 P. 1, 5 
(Utah 1899); see also Shurtleff, 2006 UT at ¶ 18.  Because the Conatser Easement grows 
from statutory roots, when the Utah legislature enacted the Act, no constitutional 
violation occurred.  The Act merely clarified and defined the public’s statutory right to 
use of Utah’s waters. 
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2. The Framers did not recognize public ownership or 
recreational rights. 
This Court has set forth the standard and methodology for interpreting the 
Constitution, identifying its primary search as one “for intent and purpose.”  In re Young, 
1999 UT 6, ¶ 15, 976 P.2d 581, 586–87.  Stated otherwise, the end goal of constitutional 
construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of our Constitution.  Id.  “The 
process of interpretation, moreover, involves the judge in an exercise that implicates not 
the judge’s own view of what the law should be, but instead a determination of what the 
law is as handed down by the legislature or framers of the constitution.”  State v. Walker, 
2011 UT 53, ¶ 31, 267 P.3d 210 (Lee, J., concurring); see also American Bush v. City of 
S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 86, 140 P.3d 1235 (Durrant, J., concurring).  Sources to 
consider when conducting this interpretation include “provisions dealing generally with 
the same topic,” the “framer’s intent,” and “historical evidence . . . supported by 
independent research . . . .”  In re Young, 1999 UT at ¶ 15, n.5.  Considering these 
sources, the trial court’s decision to expand Article XVII to include the Conatser 
Easement is contrary to the intent of the framers.  
Any interpretation of the Constitution requires, first, an examination of the plain 
language.  Summit Water Distribution Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2011 UT 43, ¶ 12, 
259 P.3d 1055 (citing Grand Cnty. v. Emery Cnty., 2002 UT 57, ¶ 29, 52 P.3d 1148); 
American Bush, 2006 UT at ¶ 10.  Article XVII of the Utah Constitution provides: “All 
existing rights to the use of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial 
purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed.”  The plain language confirms only the 
“rights” to use of the water extant at the time of the Constitution.  There is no reference to 
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recreation or public ownership of the waters.  These issues were deferred to the 
Legislature.    
In following this Court’s sanctioned approach of interpreting constitutional 
provisions in terms of the “then-contemporary understanding of what they were to 
accomplish,” the conclusion dictated by Article XVII’s plain language finds support.  
Termed the “Irrigation Article,” Article XVII focused solely on protecting the public’s 
appropriated rights for use of water such as for irrigation, mining and manufacturing.   
i) Pre-statehood laws demonstrate the absence of a recreational 
easement extant at the time of the Constitution. 
As an arid territory, Utah’s laws pertaining to water rights existed not only in the 
territorial laws, but also in Utah specific water laws adopted by the legislature of the 
territory of Utah.  In all of these laws, water rights were couched squarely in the use of 
the body of water for irrigation, mining and manufacturing.  These laws define the 
“existing” rights confirmed by Article XVII.  
The Federal Laws enacted in 1866 state, in the section for Desert Lands, that the 
“water supply upon the public lands . . . shall remain and be held free for the 
appropriation and use of the public for irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes 
subject to existing rights.”  Compiled Laws of Utah, Vol. 1 Desert Lands, § 426 (1888).  
Similarly, the section on Water Rights provides that “whenever, by priority of possession, 
rights to the use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing or other purposes, have 
vested and accrued . . . the possessor and owners of such vested rights shall be 
maintained and protected in the same.”  Id. at Water Rights, § 422.  The then-
contemporary meaning of water rights in the context of the Federal Territorial Acts 
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equates to the use of the body of water for survival purposes, namely irrigation, mining 
and manufacturing.  
In 1880, the Legislature for the Territory of Utah enacted a Water Code 
recognizing the rights of prior water-appropriators for irrigation, mining, and 
manufacturing.  See Compiled Laws of Utah, Vol. 2, Water Rights, § 2775–2789.  
Similar to the Territorial Acts, the Code stated that, “[a] right to the use of water for any 
useful purpose, such as domestic purposes, irrigating lands, propelling machinery, 
washing and sluicing ores, and other like purposes, is hereby recognized . . . .”  Id. at 
§ 2780, s. 6.  Notably, the language of this statute foreshadows that of Article XVII and 
cites as examples of rights for any “useful” purpose appropriated rights, not recreational 
rights. 
These pre-Constitution laws demonstrate that the meaning of the words “use of 
water” leading up to the enactment of Article XVII pertained exclusively to irrigation, 
mining, manufacturing “and other like purposes.”  
ii) The Constitutional Convention Proceedings leave public 
ownership to the Legislature.  
When attempting to discern the intent and purpose behind a constitutional 
provision, the constitutional convention proceedings prove a valuable resource.  See, e.g., 
American Fork City v. Crosgrove, 701 P.2d 1069, 1072–73 (Utah 1985); Summit Water 
Distribution Co., 2011 UT at ¶ 12.  The Constitutional Convention proceedings on 
Article XVII reinforce the meaning of the “use of water” that saturates the Territorial 





 and the “minority report on the subject of irrigation.”  Constitutional 
Convention Proceedings (“Const. Conv. Proc.”), Apr. 5, 1895 at 711.
4
  The “emphasis on 
private ownership of water rights clearly dominated the thinking of delegates to the 
constitutional convention. . . .  [And the debate] focused on assuring the sanctity of the 
private right to use water, and on confirmation of claims on this limited resource that 
were already in place.”  Jean Bickmore White, The Utah State Constitution: A Reference 
Guide, Article XVII, 179 (1998).  Equally apparent is the absence of any intent to create 
or recognize a recreational easement.  Id.  For example, Mr. Eldredge discussed the 
multiple uses of water relevant to Article XVII:  
There are different classes of rights we acquire to water; there are certain 
rights we acquire which only constitute a right to the use of the water, as for 
illustration, there may be a mill situated upon a stream and that is permitted 
to divert the water from its channel, carry it down and over its wheel and 
pass it back into the stream, and thus not infringe upon the rights of any 
person that may have acquired a right to the use of the water or even a right 
to the absorption of the water below them.  Now that is one class of right.  
Another class of right would be a farmer.  He takes a stream of water upon 
his land and he exhausts that stream.  There is not one particle of it that 
passes off from his farm to go on to afford its use for somebody else, hence, 
there are two different modes in which the rights to water attach.   
Const. Conv. Proc., Apr. 19, 1895 at 1216. The then-contemporary meaning of water 
rights ultimately confirmed by Article XVII as understood by Mr. Eldredge and his 
colleagues pertained to privately-acquired use of water such as for irrigation, mining and 
manufacturing.  The framers made no mention of recreation or streambeds.  They did, 
                                                 
3
 See The Irrigation Article, Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 11, 1895; Work of the Committee – 
Irrigation Questions, Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 14, 1895; That Irrigation Article, Deseret 
News, Mar. 23, 1895; Irrigation in the Constitution, Deseret News, Apr. 6, 1895. 
4
 Available at http://le.utah.gov/documents/conconv/utconstconv.htm .   
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however, decline to constitutionalize public ownership – the very principle to which the 
trial court attached a right to recreate. 
At first, the debates over Article XVII centered on the “majority” report that 
vested water rights in the State, and by extrapolation, the people of the State.
5
  See id. at 
1203.  The framers expressly rejected this majority report after a feeling of general 
uneasiness about including these provisions in the Constitution dominated the framers’ 
discussions.  Id. at 1203, 1209, 1214.  Most framers shared the sentiments of 
Mr. Chidester, who preferred to leave the issue of water rights in the hands of the 
Legislature, agitating “I think it is unsafe to couch [water rights issues] within the 
Constitution, but leave that to future legislation, and I think that they will govern this 
matter and enact laws that will be calculated to further the ends of justice in this regard.”  
Id. at 1203.  Mr. Hammond echoed these thoughts: “I have been a user of irrigation water 
ever since this Territory was formed, . . . and I am satisfied and have been to leave this 
matter entirely in the hands of our Legislature . . . .”  Id. at 1213.  Mr. Barnes concurred:  
“the whole matter should be left to the Legislature.  Id. at 1214.   
Others worried the provision would effectively divest farmers of long-held rights 
to the use of particular water.  As Mr. Jolley surmised,  
                                                 
5
 The original proposal included Section 1 that provided for public ownership. It read:  
 
The waters of all natural springs, streams, lakes and collections of still 
water, within the boundaries of the State are hereby declared to be the 
property of the State; but such ownership shall in no way impair any 
existing lawfully acquired right to the use of said waters. 
 
Jean Bickmore White, Charter for Statehood: The Story of Utah’s State Constitution 78 
(1996) (photograph of James P. Low’s workbook). 
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I would state that there appears to be a great uneasiness among the farmers 
of this Territory in relation to the word ceding the water to the State.  They 
feel as though they ought to be protected very pointedly in their already 
acquired rights, and that the Legislature will be a safe body to regulate 
those things . . . .” 
Id. at 1204; see also id. at 1216 (Mr. Eldredge).  
In the end, the framers would not adopt the originally proposed language that 
would have constitutionalized public ownership of the waters.  Rather, the framers 
adopted a portion of what was proposed as the “minority report.”
6
  The framers did so to 
put farmers and other irrigators at ease that their then-existing entitlements to water 
would not be abrogated by operation of the constitution.  See, e.g., Const. Conv. Proc., 
Apr. 20, 1895 at 1233.  When given the opportunity to adopt a constitutional provision 
naming water rights as public property and to enumerate the scope of the rights of the 
public in the waters, the framers declined, leaving the issue to the Legislature.    
During discussion of Article XVII, the framers focused on the use of the corpus of 
the water itself and ensuring that those who used and appropriated the water pre-
Constitution for irrigation purposes would not lose their rights with Utah’s entrance into 
the United States.  They did not address recreation.  Reading into Article XVII a 
                                                 
6
 Section 1 of the minority report provided:“All existing rights to the use of any of the 
waters of this State for any useful purpose, shall be recognized and confirmed.  Const. 
Conv. Proceedings, Apr. 5, 1895 at 711.  Section 2 originally included in the minority 
report was never adopted as the framers were “in favor of leaving the whole thing to [the 
legislature and] not directing that they shall do certain things.”  Const. Conv. 
Proceedings, Apr. 19 1895 at 1217. 
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currently held by the state or later acquired by the state – to a determination by a court as 
to whether such a regulation was in the public’s interest.  If the trial court’s definition of 
“disposition” is sustained, there is no restriction on what can be challenged.  The 
determination of what is in the best interest of the public will ultimately not be made by 
the State’s elected body, but by its courts.  
Conversely, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “disposition” as: “1.  The act of 
transferring something to another's care or possession, esp. by deed or will; the 
relinquishing of property. . . .”  DISPOSITION, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).  
Application of this definition of “dispose” is consistent with Illinois Central, its progeny, 
and American jurisprudence, all of which require a cession or abdication of control.  
Application of this definition would avoid myriad potential suits by aggrieved recreators 
prohibited in any way from hunting or fishing when and where they want.  Application of 
this definition would have, and should have, ended the inquiry as to the Act, which is 
nothing more than a revocable regulation subject to change by a future legislature.  
The Legislature has retained the capacity to change the law with respect to stream 
access at any time should the public so demand.  In the words of the trial court, a 
different legislature may strike a different balance.  And for this reason, it was error to 
conclude that the Act violated the public trust doctrine. 
D. The Act Did Not Substantially Impair Public Interest in the 
Waters that Remain. 
Trial was held on the issue of whether the Act “substantially impaired the public’s 
interest in the lands and waters remaining.”  The question of substantial impairment 
exists not only in the trial court’s erroneous test, but in Illinois Central after 
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determination of a disposition.  Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 454-55; (R. 1111-1112).  
Yet, even if the trial court was correct to apply the test that it did, the trial court 
nevertheless erred in its determination that USAC met its burden to prove that the Act 
substantially impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining.  
Utah jurisprudence places a heavy burden on parties endeavoring to prove 
legislation unconstitutional: “‘[S]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional until the 
contrary is clearly shown.  It is only when statutes manifestly infringe upon some 
constitutional provision that they can be declared void.  Every reasonable presumption 
must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor of constitutionality.’”  
Jones v. Utah Board of Pardons & Parole, 2004 UT 53, ¶ 10, 94 P.3d 283 (quoting Salt 
Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (quoting In re Estate of Baer, 562 
P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977))) (emphasis added).  This was the burden articulated by the 
trial court.  (R. 0735).  USAC did not meet this burden. 
In reaching its conclusion that the Act substantially impaired the public’s interest 
in the lands and waters that remain based solely on the purported “closure of more than 
2,700 miles of Utah rivers and streams to almost all public recreational use” the trial 
court failed to resolve all reasonable presumptions and reasonable doubts in favor of 
constitutionality.  (R. 2650).  The trial court’s conclusion that the Act substantially 
impairs the public’s interest in the lands and waters that remain is incorrect for the 
following reasons: (1) the trial court failed to examine the impairment of the lands and 
waters “remaining”; (2) the  proper scope of any quantitative inquiry must have 
considered more than “fishable miles” of streams and rivers; (3) the trial court grounded 
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its conclusion on unreliable numbers and resolved doubts against rather than in favor of 
constitutionality; and (4) the trial court’s analysis misconstrued the question presented by 
limiting its inquiry to a quantitative assessment of fishing rather than a qualitative 
assessment of recreation. 
1. The trial court did not examine what “remained.” 
Both the trial court’s new test and the  Illinois Central test provide that in the 
event of a disposition (or a statute tantamount to a disposition), the court must examine 
whether the state action was accomplished “without substantial impairment of the 
public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining.”  This aspect of the test asks the court 
to examine not the property disposed of, but what is left of the public’s interest after 
disposition.  Here, the trial court erred in examining how much was purportedly lost by 
passage of the Act rather than what remained after passage of the Act. 
Admittedly, this is a conceptually difficult inquiry when applied to the Act or any 
statute regulating public lands or waters at large.  It raises difficult questions such as 
causation (i.e., whether the Act or some other variable impaired an ability to recreate), 
quality (i.e., some miles of river may be more valuable to anglers than others), or degree 
(i.e., what constitutes “substantial” impairment).  Perhaps cognizant of this difficulty, all 
public trust doctrine tests of which VRA is aware, other than that which the trial court 
crafted, require a tangible disposition of specific property, the impact of which can be 
more easily determined.
11
  A revocable regulation will not suffice.  
                                                 
11
 By way of example, a sale of dock on a large reservoir avoids the question of 
causation.  It is it is a single transaction the impact of which can be independently 
assessed as opposed to multiple layers of regulation.  By way of example, regulations 
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Nevertheless, the question – as framed by both the trial court and Illinois Central – 
requires examination of the remainder and not the property disposed.  Here, USAC 
presented no evidence that any angler or, in fact, any recreator was prohibited from 
engaging in recreation on available waters because of the Act.  Stated another way, 
USAC offered no testimony that a member was precluded from accessing public waters 
because of the Act.  In this respect, the trial court erred in finding that USAC met its 
burden as to substantial impairment of what “remains.” 
2. Any quantitative impairment analysis required 
assessment of flat water and non-fishable miles of streams. 
Because the Act did not negatively affect angling on flat water, such as lakes and 
reservoirs, USAC focused its arguments on – and limited its evidence to – rivers and 
streams and in particular “fishable rivers and streams.”  The trial court appears to have 
been hooked by this limited focus and incorrectly restricted its analysis to fishable rivers 
and streams.  While recognizing, initially, that ascertaining the scope of any impairment 
of the “lands and waters remaining” required an analysis of the entire proper public trust 
resource, namely the waters of the state of Utah generally, the trial court deviated from 
this analysis at trial, improperly focusing solely on “fishable streams.”  
The trial court’s narrow focus proves problematic.  The Act’s application is not 
limited to streams, let alone “fishable” streams.  The Act applies to public waters, defined 
as all waters “flowing or collecting on the surface: (A) within a natural or realigned 
                                                                                                                                                             
prohibit bait fishing on certain streams and rivers of the state, meaning those streams and 
rivers were off limits to certain types of anglers with or without the Act.  Similarly, a sale 
of a dock may actually impair the public’s interest in the remainder if no other public 
access point exists effectively making the lake off limits to everyone despite the fact that 
the lake itself – apart from the dock – remains in public ownership.   
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channel; or (B) in a natural lake, pond, or reservoir on a natural or realigned channel.”  
Utah Code Ann. § 73-29-102(8).  Likewise, the Conatser Easement is not limited to 
fishing.  Conatser, 2008 UT 48, ¶ 8 (quoting J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137).  It applies to all 
recreators – bird watchers, hunters, fur trappers and anglers, to name a few.  Any focus 
solely on streams is artificial.  Any focus on “fishable” waters is artificial.  Non-angling 
recreators are not restricted to “fishable streams.”  Bird-watchers do not require the 
presence of sport fish or a viable fishery to bird watch.  Hunters and fur trappers do not 
need sport fish to partake in their desired recreation.  (See, e.g., R. 3714).  And any water 
in the State with sufficient depth and flow is floatable and accessible to boaters under the 
plain language of the Stream Access Act – it need not be “fishable” to be floatable.  Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-29-202(1).  
Set forth in the stipulated facts, USAC “estimates” that Utah has 20,800 miles of 
river and streams, 850 miles of which are navigable, 12,700 miles of which traverse 
public or tribal grounds and 7,250 miles of which traverse private ground.  (R. 2435).  At 
trial, however, no evidence was presented regarding what recreational opportunities on 
any of these miles or any flat water, – public or private – were foreclosed by the Act 
other than stream angling.  (See, passim, R. 2876-4542).  
The trial court disregarded these shortcomings and instead evaluated impairment 
solely on the basis of “fishable” miles.  (R. 2659; 4855).  The 2,700 miles representing 
43% of the purportedly 6,419 miles of fishable streams may have relevance for a subset 
of the angling public that prefers to fish on rivers and streams, but it is meaningless when 
it comes to the purported effect of the Act on anglers who prefer to use flat water, or non-
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angling recreators that do not require a “fishable” stream.  The amount of water available 
to all water recreators in Utah besides that subset of anglers who fish on rivers and 
streams remains wholly unknown.  Accordingly, the trial court’s conclusion that the Act 
represents the “closure of 43% of Utah’s fishable rivers and stream miles to nearly all 
fishing, and to all hunting, wading, swimming, bird-watching, and any other recreational 
activity utilizing the water” is not supported based upon the evidence presented and 
USAC’s burden.  (R. 2654-2655).  The quantitative degree of impairment is thus, also, 
unknown and it was error to conclude otherwise.   
3. The trial court failed to resolve all doubts in favor of 
constitutionality.  
USAC, VRA and the State stipulated that the miles of fishable streams that flow 
over private property are not known with full accuracy.  There are numerous factors to 
consider such as (1) whether there is Walk-In-Access (“WIA”); (2) whether a property 
owner permits fishing on her property; and, (3) whether a property owner has cultivated 
or marked her property with no trespassing signs.  (R. 2435-2436).  Moreover, the 
numbers offered by the State on the Stream Access Map, as clearly explained with their 
offering, are simply guidelines provided as general reference and the accuracy is not 
guaranteed: “the Information provided is not binding on courts, prosecuting attorneys or 
other law-enforcement agencies.”  (R. 2433, Ex. 2).   
The trial court recognized that the State’s numbers suffer from multiple errors.  
The Stream Access Map does not properly reflect streambeds owned by municipalities 
where there may be public access.  (R. 2628-2634; 3337-3341; 3344; 3362; 3703-3707; 
3710; 3743-3747; 3881-3883; 3890-3892; 4443; 4451-4452; 4462-4463; 4489-4490).  
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The DWR Regional Aquatics Managers testified to errors on the Stream Access Map as a 
result of oversight or human error or another unknown culprit.  (Id.; Exs. 1; 4.1– 4.5; 22–
25).  Further, the numbers are unreliable because “fishable streams” is a subjective term.  
(R. 2432; 2628-2634; 3291-3292; 3381; 4449; 4464-4465).  DWR Regional Aquatics 
Managers defined this term differently, all concluding that a “fishable” stream has sport 
fish, but acknowledging the need to make a subjective determination of what anglers 
prefer.  (Id.).  Thus streams may have been excluded from the Map that one angler or 
even a different DWR Manager might consider fishable.  (Id.).  Similarly, streams today 
deemed non-navigable, may tomorrow be deemed navigable and, thus, open to the public 
even under the Act.  (R. 2251).  The trial court disregarded this very real fluidity in the 
applicable numbers. 
Despite the inaccuracies and unknowns inherent in the State’s numbers, the trial 
court relied on these numbers, dismissing any inaccuracies as failures of the State rather 
than resolving these inaccuracies in favor of constitutionality.  For example, rather than 
conclude that Walk-In-Access renders the number of purported fishable miles “closed” 
under the Act artificially high, the trial court brushed off WIA noting that the landowner 
can revoke such access without cause on 30-day’s notice.  (R. 2655; Ex. 6).  The trial 
court disregarded the fact that many property owners do not always mark their property 
or otherwise allow permissive fishing on their property.  Given USAC’s burden and the 
trial court’s duty to resolve doubts in favor of constitutionality, the trial court’s finding of 
a substantial impairment rooted solely in unreliable, turbid, stream mile estimates cannot 
be sustained.  
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4. The trial court’s analysis misconstrues the question 
presented. 
The trial court concluded that the Act substantially impaired the public’s interest 
in what remains because it purportedly placed a quantity of Utah’s water – 43% of Utah’s 
fishable rivers and streams – beyond the limits of Utah’s recreators.  (R. 2659; 4855).  
This analysis exposes a misunderstanding of the question presented.  The question was 
whether the Act substantially impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters that 
remain.  That is, the focus is on the water that remains and the public’s ability to exercise 
its interest – namely its recreational easement – on these waters.  (R. 0763; 2015-2018); 
see also Weden, 135 Wash. 2d 678; Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v., 671 P.2d 
1085; State v. Public Service Comm., 81 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1957); Vill. of Lake Delton, 
286 N.W.2d at 632.  It is not tied to a particular property.  (Id.).  This requires a 
qualitative, rather than a purely quantitative assessment.  And the reported quality is high.  
As the trial court found, the public continues to enjoy the ability to engage in 
every type of recreation in and on the waters that remain.  (R. 1629; 1636-1640; 1948-
1959; 2637-2640).  That some rivers and streams in Utah may be off limits to certain 
types of recreation does not change the fact that Utah’s angling public remains on the 
whole satisfied with its angling experiences.  (R. 3255-3256; 3262-3263; 4229-4231; 
Ex. 9, pp. 91–92; Ex. 10.1, pp. 93-135).
12
  Utah anglers report that private property 
restrictions have not substantially impaired their angling experience.  (R. 1629; 2637-
                                                 
12 
Here, again, however the trial court ignored its duty to resolve all doubts in favor of 
constitutionality, blatantly dismissing a survey finding that “relatively few respondents 
felt that private property restrictions contribute to major limitations in access preferred 
fishing areas.”  (R. 2640; Ex. 9, pp. 91-92).  
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2640).  Utah anglers report high levels of satisfaction.  And the Utah DWR Regional 
Aquatics Mangers confirmed this conclusion, testifying that all types of angling 
experiences exist in their region even after the Act.  (R. 3336-3337; 3366; 3703; 3709; 
3720; 3748-3749; 3895-3896; 4468-4469). 
Of import, no evidence was offered concerning whether the experience of any type 
of recreators other than anglers and boaters was impaired even an iota.  The trial court 
could not determine whether birdwatchers, hunters, trappers, or any other group, are 
negatively impacted by the Act.  (See, passim, R. 2876-4542). 
The public’s interest – the recreational easement – continues to flourish for anglers 
on the waters that remain.  The trial court’s finding of substantial impairment based on an 
artificial number –fishable miles – extrapolated to an improper conclusion about all water 
recreators in Utah, when that number was explicitly limited to fishable streams, provides 
no meaningful measurement of impairment.  USAC limited its focus to a very narrow 
subset of the fishing population on a very narrow subset of Utah’s waters.  The 
experience of so few cannot be grafted onto the experience of all water recreators, 
especially in light of contradictory evidence indicating high levels of satisfaction in the 
angling community and the absolute absence of any evidence on the impact on 
birdwatchers, hunters, trappers, or any other subset of recreators.  USAC did not meet its 
burden to show that the Act has substantially impaired the public’s interest in the waters 






For the reasons set forth herein, VRA respectfully requests that the decisions of 
the trial court be reversed and judgment entered in favor of VRA.  VRA also respectfully 
requests an award of its costs on appeal. 
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language as we understand it and we conceive the framers meant it to be 
understood. 
Id. at 637. 
 The court’s role is not to adjudicate or extrapolate “natural law”; it is to apply the 
Constitution according to its language. The Constitution does not cloak “natural law” in 
constitutionality either inherently or through Article I, Section 25. It does not impose 
upon the legislature limits not specifically articulated. Here, the Act does not violate any 
constitutional right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams.  No such 
right exists. 
III. ARTICLE XVII DID NOT RECOGNIZE OR CONFIRM A RIGHT IN THE 
PUBLIC TO TOUCH THE PRIVATELY-OWNED BEDS OF NON-
NAVIGABLE WATERS. 
USAC argues at length that the ownership of water and, thus, the claimed “right” 
to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams is rooted in natural law and 
has existed since the time of Justinian and, thus, such an “existing” right was confirmed 
by the plain language of Article XVII. (Opposition at pp. 23–32). Irrespective of the 
question of ownership of water, USAC’s claimed right to touch the privately-owned beds 
of non-navigable streams is of recent statutory derivation and not one that traveled from 
the Roman Empire to England, across the Atlantic Ocean, and over the plains to Utah. 
And as a statutory “right”, the Legislature operated well within the bounds of its authority 
to change, modify, or limit the public’s ability to touch the privately-owned beds of 
streams. 
In their opening briefs, VRA and amicus cite to and quote from the records of the 
Constitutional Convention demonstrating: (a) that the focus of Article XVII was to 
preserve established appropriated rights; (b) that the result of the convention was to defer 
questions regarding the ownership and administration of waters “in the state” to the 
12 
1247930.1 
legislature; and (c) that there was no attention paid or reference made to any public 
“right” to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams. (VRA Brief at pp. 
17–27; Amicus Brief at pp. 9–14). Notably, USAC does not dispute this characterization 
with any reference to the conventions proceedings themselves. (See generally 
Opposition) 
A. A “Use” Does Not Equate to a “Right.” 
Article XVII, by its plain language, confirms then-existing “rights”; it does not 
confirm existing “uses.”  VRA stipulated to certain historical “uses.” (Opposition at p. 
22). It did not stipulate that those “uses” derived from any inherent or natural rights or 
that any corollary “right” was found in the contemporary law. In fact, the trial court 
specifically concluded that prior to Conatser, it was understood that landowners were 
entitled to exclude the public from the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams. 
(R. 2620, ¶ 40). The correctness of the trial court’s conclusion on this point is not 
challenged by any party on appeal. 
Nor does the case law relied upon by USAC demonstrate any recognized or 
inherent public right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable streams. That 
case law addresses only the rights to the use and public ownership of the corpus of the 




                                              
4
 By way of example, USAC cites to Munroe v. Ivies, 2 Utah 535, 538 (1880) with the 
quote: “This is a free country, and the lands are open to all, and the appropriation of 
water is open to all…” (emphasis added). (Opposition at p. 24). It cites Salt Lake City v. 
Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 24 Utah 249, 67 P. 672, 677 (1902), for the 
premise that the public owns and has always owned  Utah’s waters, irrespective of 
statute.  Aside from the fact that this case did not address any use of the beds of the 
waters, it also expressly notes that the rights of the public are limited. USAC’s own 
parenthetical summarizes the holding as “Utah’s waters are public waters until diverted.” 
(Opposition at p. 24) (emphasis added).  That is, the public ownership described in 
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Public ownership of the corpus of the water is not in dispute in this appeal. In fact, 
it is expressly preserved and confirmed by the Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1. 
Notably absent from USAC’s Opposition is any case from any jurisdiction or any time 
that recognizes a “natural right” or a constitutional public right to touch the privately-
owned beds of non-navigable streams. The only case cited for this premise is Conatser.  




B. Jurisprudence Demonstrates the Absence of a “Right” to Touch 
Privately-Owned Beds of Non-Navigable Streams. 
USAC argues that “public ownership of natural waters can be traced to both 
Roman law and natural law.” (Opposition at p. 23).  Even if broadly true, this point is 
immaterial. As discussed above, “natural law” is not a basis on which to “challenge laws 
enacted by a democratically elected legislature.” Gardner, 947 P.2d at 637. More 
fundamentally, however, even if public ownership of water is rooted in “natural law”, 
there is no suggestion that any “right” to touch the privately-owned beds is also so rooted 
or that such a “right” existed to be “confirmed” in Article XVII of the Constitution in 
1895. The converse is true. 
1. Landowners Have a Long-Recognized Right to Exclude the Public 
from Privately-Owned Submerged Lands. 
The Utah Constitution was drafted in 1895. Article XVII confirmed only then-
extant “rights to the use of any waters in this State for any useful or beneficial 
                                                                                                                                                  
addition to applying only to the corpus of the water was also inherently limited. None of 
the cases cited address the use of the beds. All address the use of the corpus of the water.  
See Uintah Basin v. United States, 2006 UT 19, ¶ 34, 133 P.3d 410; Provo River Water 
Users Ass’n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 933 n. 8 (Utah 1993); Adams, 72 P.2d at 652-53; 
Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580, 584 (1925).  
 
5
 See Section I, supra. 
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purpose….”  The claimed public “right” to touch the privately-owned beds of non-
navigable streams was not among those recognized rights.  
In 1891 – a mere four years before Utah’s Constitutional Convention – the United 
States Supreme Court undertook the task of adjudicating the ownership of riparian lands 
in Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 11 S. Ct. 808 (1891). The Hardin Court surveyed the 
historical treatment of ownership of those lands and the rights of the public therein. In so 
doing, the Court recognized the long history of private ownership: “And centuries before 
Justinian, Cicero spoke of the many lands, houses, lakes, ponds, places, and possessions 
confiscated by Scylla, and conferred upon his own favorites.”  Hardin, 140 U.S. at 390 
(emphasis added). The Court did not, however, recognize an unimpeachable right of the 
public to access and utilize such private property. Rather, it recognized the positive right 
of landowners to exclude the public.  
In a summary statement, the Hardin Court wrote:  
 
The cases are innumerable in which actions of trespass have been sustained 
for fishing in a several fishery, (which is the exclusive right to fish in one’s 
own waters, or is derived therefrom by grant;) or in which the action of 
trespass has been defended by the plea of common fishery, (which is the 
right to fish in the waters of another.) The right of public fishery is never 
mentioned except in connection with tidewaters where the title to the land 
is in the crown. It is never said that this right exists in lakes or ponds, or 
in any other fresh waters. 
Hardin, 140 U.S. at 389 (emphasis added). Express in this statement is that there was, in 
1891, recognition of private ownership of lands and waters and recognition of the right to 
exclude the public. This contradicts not only any contention of a natural public right to 
touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable bodies of waters, but even the more 




 The Hardin Court undertook a review of the historical common law and identified 
myriad cases in which claims of trespass were adjudicated not on the basis of a general 
right of the public to use the corpus of the water, but upon the question of whether the 
property was properly subject to public or private ownership.   
By way of example, the Hardin court refers to the decision of the courts of 
England in Bristow v. Cormican, L.R. 3 App. Cas. 641, in which a riparian landowner 
pursued an action for trespass for fishing in a lake. Hardin, 140 U.S. at 391. Ultimately, 
the claim of trespass was rejected because the lake (15 miles in length, 10 miles in 
breadth) was subject to public ownership and not on the grounds that the public had an 
inherent right of access to private lands and waters.   
The matter of Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 33 N.J.L. 223, a case cited by the 
Hardin court arising out of New Jersey, involved a similar claim of trespass defended on 
the grounds that “the lake belonged to the state.”  Plaintiff’s claim of trespass was 
sustained. The court wrote: “The title of the individual, being personal in him, is 
exclusive, subject only to a servitude to the public for the purposes of navigation, if the 
waters are navigable in fact.” Hardin, 140 U.S. at 395 (emphasis added).  
In Beckman v. Kreamer, 443 Ill. 447, the Illinois Supreme Court adjudicated the 
rights of the public to fish on waters claimed to be the subject of private ownership. The 
Court there concluded: “By the common law, a right to take fish belongs so essentially to 
the right of soil in streams or bodies of water, where the tide does not ebb or flow, that if 
the riparian proprietor owns upon both sides of such stream no one but himself may come 
upon the limits of his land and take fish there….”  Hardin, 140 U.S. at 396 (citing 
Kreamer, 443 Ill. 447). The public had no right of access or use of the stream in question. 
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 The cases referenced above were among a number relied upon in Hardin.  None of 
that precedent was disturbed. The Hardin Court explicitly recognized that waters and 
submerged lands may be subject to private ownership and, in such instance, the owner 
then had the right to exclude. In neither Hardin nor the myriad cases cited therein is there 
mentioned a “natural right” that allowed the public access to privately owned lands for 
fishing or any other use of water. The public had no right – natural or otherwise – to 
access or touch such lands that could have been confirmed by Article XVII of the 
Constitution in 1895. 
2. Determination of Riparian Landowners’ Rights Is in the Domain of 
the Legislature. 
The United States Supreme Court in 1894 was again asked to address the question 
of ownership of submerged lands in the matter of Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894).  
As a general premise, it wrote: “The common law of England upon this subject, at the 
time of emigration of our ancestors, is the law of this country except so far as it has been 
modified by the charters, constitutions, statutes, or usages of the several colonies, or by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States.”  Shively, 152 U.S. at 14. The Shively 
Court recognized that it is the prerogative of the States – through their legislatures – to 
determine the bounds of riparian ownership and the associated rights. 
In conjunction with its survey of the laws of various states on the question of the 
extent of riparian ownership, the Shively Court reverted to and relied upon its Hardin 
decision from 1891, quoting:  
 
This right of the states to regulate and control the shores of tide-waters, and 
the land under them, is the same as that which is exercised by the crown in 
England. In this country the same rule has been extended to our great 
navigable lakes, which are treated as inland seas; and also, in some states, 
to navigable rivers, as the Mississippi, the Missouri, the Ohio, and, in 
Pennsylvania, to all the permanent rivers of the state; but it depends on the 
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law of each state to what waters and to what extent this prerogative of the 
state over the lands under water shall be exercised. 
Shively, 152 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hardin, 140 U.S. at 382) (emphasis added).  More 
succinctly, the Shively Court quoted with approval Justice Brewer’s dissent in Hardin: 
“Beyond all dispute, the settled law of this court, established by repeated decisions, is 
that the question how far the title of a riparian extends is one of local law.  For a 
determination of that question, the statutes of the state and the decisions of its highest 
court furnish the best and final authority.”  Shively, 152 U.S. at 46 (quoting Hardin, 
140 U.S. at 402, Brewer J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
Under the decisions of Hardin in 1891 and Shively in 1894, it is clear that the 
question of the scope of ownership of submerged lands, and the rights associated 
therewith, were questions to be left to the states and their legislatures. While certain 
governing principles flow from the common law of England, no natural right of access or 
use or even of public ownership of all waters are among the principles that might restrict 
the authority of a state legislature. In 1895, the framers of the Utah Constitution acted 
consistent with these principles and left the administration of water and the ownership of 
water to the judgment of the legislature.   
C. The Legislature’s Regulation of the Conatser Easement Does Not 
Implicate Constitutional Constraints. 
The trial court determined in this matter that the easement identified in Conatser 
was rooted in Article XVII. (R. 0758). As shown, however, neither the public ownership 
of water nor the “corollary” right to touch the privately-owned beds of non-navigable 
streams are inherent in either the Constitution or the historical jurisprudence. The “right” 
arose for the first time as a product of statute with the Conatser decision in 2008 and, as 
such, is subject to modification or amendment by the legislature. 
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The Conatser Court made clear that it was engaged in statutory construction and 
interpretation; it was not engaged in constitutional analysis.  Conatser reads:   
 
By statute, “all waters in this state, whether above or underground, are 
hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing 
rights to the use thereof.” Under this doctrine of “public ownership,” the 
public owns state waters and has an “easement over the water regardless of 
who owns the water bed beneath.”  In granting the public this easement, 
“state policy recognizes an interest of the public in the use of state waters 
for recreational purposes.”  
Conatser, 2008 UT at ¶ 8 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis 
added)). The Court was engaged in an analysis of a statute that conferred public 
ownership. It recognized that this statute, not natural law or the Constitution, granted the 
public a recreational easement.  It cited to Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1. It did not cite to or 
interpret the Constitution. It did not cite to “natural law.” 
 The statute – Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1 – declared public ownership and 
adjudicated the scope of private ownership of beds and the rights associated therewith. 
This is a legislative responsibility and a legislative prerogative. The legislature and not 
the Constitution, having given birth to these concepts is free to restrict or broaden them as 
it sees fit. As a result, there was no basis for the trial court to go any further and to do so 
was error. 
IV. THE CONATSER EASEMENT IS NOT A RESOURCE SUBJECT TO 
PUBLIC TRUST EVALUATION. 
The public trust doctrine nominally and in both state and federal jurisprudence 
applies only to public resources. Indeed, USAC enumerates the public resources to which 
the trust has applied in Utah, to wit – sovereign and other lands acquired by the State, 
school trust lands, public waters, and the ecological integrity of public lands and their 
public recreational uses. (Opposition at p. 34). Conspicuously absent from this list is the 
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cultivate their land; (2) post their land; (3) or request that people leave their 
property. Utah Code Ann. § 73-29-102; 73-29-201.  
· The Act does not require that private property owners prevent anglers from 
using their property. Fly anglers may fish on private property with 
permission. Utah Code Ann. § 73-29-201.  
· The Act did not alter access points to water. Private property before the Act 
remains private property after the Act and is subject to and protected by the 
same trespass laws regardless of where it falls on the timeline. And just as 
before the passage of the Act, anglers could not cut across private property 
to access a stream, absent landowner permission, this remains the case after 
the passage of the Act as well. See id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
206). 
· Finally, the Act had no appreciable effect on flat-water recreation. (R. 
2536). 
All in all, the Act did not alter the vast majority of public uses. In fact, and as truly 
at issue here, the only substantive effect was to enable landowners to exclude the public 
from touching a portion of the beds of the streams and rivers of the State. Even this, 
however, is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that the Act substantially impaired 
the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining. 
B. USAC Failed to Meet Its Burden to Prove Substantial Impairment of 
the Public’s Interest in the Lands and Waters Remaining. 
1. The Trial Court’s Reliance on Mileage of “Fishable” Streams Was 
Error. 
USAC attempts to obscure the trial court’s error by contending that the trial court 
based its finding of substantial impairment on something more than just the mileage of 
fishable streams. (Opposition at p. 57). But in reaching its end result, the trial court 
showed its math, so to speak. The trial court’s ruling was based solely on the numbers.  
The trial court acknowledged that the sole question before it at trial was whether 
the Act substantially impaired the public’s interest in the lands and waters that remain 
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after passage of the Act. The trial court considered, and rejected, USAC’s argument on 
crowding as an embodiment of substantial impairment. (R. 2650) The trial court then 
considered USAC’s argument, “in the alternative … that the public’s interest in the lands 
and waters remaining is substantially impaired by the Act’s sweeping closure of more 
than 2,700 miles of Utah's rivers and streams to almost all public recreational use. In 
other words, the Act results in substantial impairment by virtue of its scope.”  (Id.). 
Plainly stated, the trial court based its finding of substantial impairment solely on the 
numbers. (R. 2659) (“Here, the Act closed more than 43% of Utah’s fishable rivers and 
streams to almost all public recreational use. This expansive disposition impairs the 
public’s interest in the waters remaining, because what remains is so drastically 
diminished.”). 
The trial court’s conclusion that the Act substantially impairs the public’s interest 
in the lands and waters that remain, based solely on the impact of miles on which to 
recreate, suffers from a number of errors.
16
 The trial court’s finding that what remains is 
“drastically diminished” is a numerical finding. (Id.). The court’s logic is that “what 
remains” is reduced in size by the Act’s closure of 43% of Utah’s fishable streams.  But 
error pervades that logic.  What was “diminished” is the whole, not the remainder.  That 
is, what’s left after the whole was diminished by 43% is, by definition, what remains.  
                                              
16
 Several of these errors are enumerated in VRA’s opening brief and are not rehashed 
here, including: “(1) the trial court failed to examine the impairment of the lands and 
waters “remaining”; (2) the proper scope of any quantitative inquiry must have 
considered more than “fishable miles” of streams and rivers; (3) the trial court grounded 
its conclusion on unreliable numbers and resolved doubts against rather than in favor of 
constitutionality; and (4) the trial court’s analysis misconstrued the question presented by 
limiting its inquiry to a quantitative assessment of fishing rather than a qualitative 
assessment of recreation.” (VRA Brief at pp. 40-41). 
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Consequently, this part of the trial court’s decision does not at all address the impairment 
of what remains.  
Moreover, the numbers do not demonstrate substantial impairment of the public’s 
interest in the lands and waters remaining after the Act as required by Illinois Central and 
its progeny. In its own words and in the first iteration of its holding, the trial court stated 
“the Act closed more than 43% of Utah's rivers and streams to almost all public 
recreational use.” (R. 2659). Upon USAC’s Motion to Amend, the trial court corrected 
this statement to read: “the Act closed more than 43% of Utah’s fishable rivers and 
streams to almost all public recreational use.”  (emphasis added) (R. 4854). But this error 
– initially concluding that the Act closed 43% of rivers and streams and then revising it to 
43% of fishable rivers and streams, which is a greatly reduced total – highlights the 
cracks in the trial court’s analysis. 
The trial court improperly focused solely on fishable rivers and streams. (R. 2659). 
That is, the trial court did not look at the impact, or lack thereof, of the Act on rivers and 
streams that do not contain fisheries. The trial court did not look at the impact of the Act 
on flat waters. The trial court did not look at the impact of the Act, or lack thereof, of the 
Act on hunters, bird watchers, waders, swimmers or any other recreators other than 
anglers and boaters. This nearsightedness renders the trial court’s ultimate conclusion of 
substantial impairment erroneous and unsustainable.  
Whether under the trial court’s newly minted test or under the widely-adopted 
Illinois Central test, in the event of a disposition (or a statute tantamount to a 
disposition), the court must examine whether the state action was accomplished “without 
substantial impairment of the public’s interest in the lands and waters remaining.” (R. 
1111); see also Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 453. Stated otherwise, the trial court’s 
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analysis required it to look at the impact on what remains, not what was impacted. The 
court must examine not the property disposed of, but what is left of the public’s interest 
after a disposition.   
Here, as noted, the trial court did not look at what remained, but rather what it 
perceived to be lost. And it perceived the loss as “fishable miles.” (R. 2659; 4854). As a 
result, the court necessarily limited its analysis to anglers who prefer to fly fish and prefer 
to do so on rivers and streams.
17
 The trial court heard testimony from a very small 
segment of Utah’s population – indeed, the minority opinion even in the angling 
population – and extrapolated the impact on this small segment to the rest of Utah’s 
recreators in order to reach its ultimate conclusion. (R. 2622–2628).  
Instead, the trial court should have focused on all of the available water-based 
recreational opportunities that exist, both on rivers and streams and also on flat waters, 
with and without fish. And the trial court should have concluded that because it received 
no evidence as to any impact on any recreator, besides anglers, on any body of water, 
besides fishable rivers and streams, that the Act did not substantially impair the public’s 
interest on the lands and waters that remain.
18
  
Perhaps understanding the task at hand but facing a dearth of evidence, the trial 
court extended its conclusion to recreators who were not represented and upon whom the 
impact of the Act is unknown.  That is, the trial court made findings about the impact of 
                                              
17
 The trial court can hardly take the blame for this limited focus as USAC presented 
evidence on only this narrow use of a very narrow slice of Utah’s waters during trial. (See 
generally R. 2876–4542).   
18
 And even the testimony as to fishing opportunities for this small subset of the angling 
population demonstrates that ample places for their desired angling experience – fly 
fishing on a river with only a few people – continues to exist (R. 1629; 1636–1640; 
1948–1959; 3586–3589; 3605–3607; 3611–3612; 3262–3263) (see also Tr. Exh. 9, pp. 
91–92; Tr. Exh. 10.1, pp. 93–135). 
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the Act on fishable rivers and streams and then concluded that this substantially impaired 
all recreators – such as hunters, birdwatchers, waders and swimmers – who can recreate 
on all waters, both flat and moving, regardless of whether they are fishable. In the trial 
court’s own words, the Act closed “43% of Utah’s fishable rivers and stream miles to 
nearly all fishing, and to all hunting, swimming, bird-watching, and any other 
recreational activity utilizing the water.” (R. 2654–55; 4854). And, setting aside VRA’s 
disagreement of the numbers, while this statement is otherwise technically sound, it is a 
meaningless metric. There is no evidence as the impact on a swimmer, who can swim on 
flat water, moving water, and water with and without fish, of the closure of streams with 
fisheries. There are an estimated 85,916 miles of rivers and streams in Utah, not to 
mention hundreds to thousands of square miles of flat water.
19
 Limiting the analysis to 
the approximately 6,219 miles that have been deemed “fishable” rivers and streams and 
looking at the impact of the Act just on these waters misconstrues the question presented 
and assumes that all other recreators can only recreate on moving water that contain 
fisheries. 
2. USAC’s Claims of Overcrowding Are Insufficient to Find a 
Violation of the Public Trust. 
To offend the public trust doctrine, the Act, itself, must substantially impair the 
public’s interest in the lands and waters that remain. (R. 2646); Illinois Central, 146 U.S. 
at 453. That is, there is a causation element. The substantial impairment must be due to 
the challenged statute. Here, the trial court rightfully concluded that the evidence of 
crowding was insufficient to find substantial impairment and, in any event, crowding 
could not be tied to the statute itself. (R. 2650 “On the question of crowding, the 
                                              
19
 See The Montana Watercourse, http://mtwatercourse.org/waterfacts.htm. 
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Coalition has failed to meet its burden of proof.”)  Nevertheless, and without appealing 
the correctness of this conclusion, USAC argues now to the contrary. 
USAC scolds VRA for failing to marshal (“i.e. ignor[ing]”) evidence related to 
crowding. (Opposition at p. 60). VRA submits that it suffered no obligation to marshal 
such evidence because VRA is not challenging the trial court’s holding with respect to 
crowding. The trial court found that substantial impairment in the form of crowding was 
not caused by the Act because of, among other things, intervening factors such as 
population growth. (R. 2650). That is, to the extent this Court now considers the evidence 
USAC sets forth of crowding, it must also take into account the evidence the trial court 
relied upon that negated USAC’s crowding argument. 
In particular, at VRA’s request during trial, the trial court took judicial notice of 
the census information. Between 2000 and 2010, Utah’s population grew from 2,233,198 
to 2,763,885. See https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-46.pdf; see also (R. 2457–
2459; 4342).This growth of over half a million people represents a 23.8% increase in 
Utah’s population. (R. 2640). This census information also shows incredible population 
growth in the areas where VRA pinpoints the most desirable angling – Central and 
Northern Utah. From 1990 to 2010, the population of Salt Lake County increased from 
725,956 to 1,029,655, the population of Summit County increased from 15,518 to 36,324, 
the population of Utah County increased from 263,590 to 516,564 and the population of 
Wasatch County increased from 10,089 to 23,530. (R. 2457–2459) (citing 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-46.pdf ). As such, the trial court properly 
found that it could not attribute crowding to the Act when growth in population is just as 
likely a causative factor. 
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Likewise, in dismissing the crowding argument, the trial court found that 
comparisons between angling in Utah and angling in Idaho and Montana carried no 
water. As explained by USAC’s witnesses, Idaho and Montana over 26,000 and 21,000 
miles of fishable rivers and streams, respectively, whereas Utah has a purported 6,400 
fishable miles. (R. 1472; 4299; Tr. Exh. 14). And Idaho and Montana have an estimated 
447,000 and 267,000 licensed anglers, respectively, whereas Utah has an estimated 
414,000 licensed anglers (Id.; see also R. 4105–4109). In other words, there is just more 
water per licensed angler in Idaho and Montana than there is in Utah. The differences in 
angling experiences between Utah and Idaho and Montana are a function of geography 
and population, and not the existence of the Act.  
The trial court properly found that the Act did not substantially impair the public’s 
interest in the lands and waters that remain vis-a-vis crowding. Instead, dismissing the 
crowding argument for lack of proof of causation, the trial court based its substantial 
impairment holding solely on the numbers. The evidence that the Act caused the 
purported crowding proves inadequate to find otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth herein as well as in VRA’s opening brief, the brief of 
amicus, and the briefs of the State, VRA respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
trial court’s judgment and direct entry of judgment in favor of VRA.  VRA further 
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1 depth that you can go into it, you know.  I mean, whether
2 you're going into it on the scientific side and thinking about
3 the--the entomology and learning that more and more in depth,
4 or whether or not you want to hone the skill of your cast or
5 whether or not you're sitting at, before you even leave it go
6 to the river, whether you've sitting at your desk at home and
7 on a vice to try to tie up a pattern to mimic one of these
8 insects before you go out.  I mean, there are so--so many
9 facets and so much depth to this activity that I don't know in
10 my life if I ever will--
11      Q    Arrive?
12      A    --arrive.  I've made it, I'm a fly fisherman now.
13      Q    Yeah.  Why don't you describe for the Court if you 
14 would what your preferred fly fishing experience is--well,
15 before we go there, let me ask you this, you've mentioned that
16 you can't experience on flat water what you can experience fly
17 fishing on a stream or a river.
18           Are there things that you can experience on flat
19 water that you don't get and maybe don't want on--on a river
20 or anywhere when you're fly fishing?
21      A    Yeah.  Unfortunately with some of the flat waters
22 that I go to or that, you know, that I've been to, there are
23 things that I'd prefer not to have.  Unfortunately, I usually
24 find some bait or trash and things like that that I prefer not
25 be up there.  There's a lot more traffic, boating traffic, for
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1 example, you know.
2      Q    Such as?
3      A    Such as boating traffic?
4      Q    What kind of boating traffic are we talking about?
5      A    Motor boats, for example, water skis,--
6      Q    Jet skis?
7      A    Jet skis.  You know, if you--if you--Jordanelle's a
8 perfect example of this.  I mean, I--it has--it has some
9 decent fishing in it but if you're trying to fish and angle
10 off the bank and somebody's coming blazing by at 50 miles an
11 hour kicking up a wake, you know, while you're trying to
12 pursue fish, that's--that's not something that I--that's not a
13 situation I prefer.
14      Q    Do you ever float tube at--you know what--what's a
15 float tube?  Why don't you explain that first?
16      A    So a float tube--a float tube--
17      Q    Kick boat, either one.
18      A    Yeah.  A float tube or a kick boat, these are--these
19 are non-motorized water craft, they are propelled by you or in
20 the--if you're taking them down a stream by the flow of the
21 current.  And yeah, they're in inflatable water craft, very
22 small, usually just enough room for you and your rod and maybe
23 some flies and then some kick fins on your feet to move you
24 around, maybe some oars if you're in a nicer pontoon boat.
25      Q    Okay.  But in the float tube, you're laying--legs 
2952





1 are dangling down into the water--
2      A    They are.
3      Q    --quite a bit more than in a kick boat?
4      A    They are.
5      Q    Okay.
6      A    And generally, you're up on a platform above the
7 water in a kick boat.
8      Q    Have you ever used a kick boat or a float tube on
9 flat water where there were boats, motorboats?
10      A    Yeah.  And it's--it's actually kinda scary on a 
11 very--very large piece of water or very busy piece of water
12 because you're in a very small craft and you're not
13 necessarily the most visible and somebody that's not paying
14 attention really--you--you run the risk of getting ran over,
15 certainly.
16      Q    And even--and even if you don't get run over, you--
17      A    If you don't get run over, you're constantly dealing
18 with wakes and--and in a small boat or a small float tube, you
19 don't want to capsize.  You know, all these things add up to
20 why I usually don't end up fishing that water.
21      Q    What about the noises that you're going to encounter
22 on flat water?
23      A    The noise from the boats, the smell of gas and 
24 exhaust.
25      Q    Okay.
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1      A    Yeah.
2      Q    So let me go back to the question I was going to ask
3 you before we started talking about jet skis and that--and the
4 like.  I would like you to describe for the Court what your
5 preferred angling experience is on a river or stream, not your
6 ideal experience, but your preferred experience.  What--what
7 kind of experience would give you satisfaction when you came
8 off the water and headed back to the real world?
9      A    Uh-huh (affirmative).  Yeah.  Well, the first--the
10 first part of the preferred experience, I would say, would be
11 getting to a spot where I can have a little bit of a sense of
12 exploration, a little bit of an adventure, so you--that
13 generally means have some open water it move around and to be
14 able to hunt and pursue trout as I--as I described before.
15           The other part of that--of that experience of having
16 an area to move around in is generally that there's not a lot
17 of people there.  It doesn't necessarily have to be total
18 solitude, I don't have to be alone, sometimes I'll go fishing
19 with some buddies of mine, but amongst us, we do prefer--do
20 prefer solitude when we're out in the wilderness, to feel like
21 we are in the wilderness, like we're interacting with nature.
22           And then generally, it's nice to have a reasonable
23 shot at catching a fish.
24      Q    You have--well, let me ask you, have you been on
25 waters where there have been other anglers besides your
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1 buddies and you, where you've had--still had a preferred
2 angling experience?
3      A    Yeah.  I have.  I have.
4      Q    Okay.  And what it, even though you--there were
5 other anglers there, what was it about those experiences that
6 you came away feeling good about your trip?
7      A    One example that I can think of right now is, I was
8 actually on the Henry's Fork in Idaho where there's typically-
9 -you're not going to be the only person there, but there is a
10 decent enough code of etiquette that--and a game that people
11 know how to play that even if there are people there, they're
12 still basically fishing to a fish.  You're--
13      Q    You alone--
14      A    Yes.
15      Q    --are fishing to that fish?
16      A    Yes.
17      Q    Okay.  What is the etiquette you speak of?
18      A    Not fishing down on--on--not fishing on top of each 
19 other, crowding each other out, moving, you know, high--
20 there's the phrase of high holing, for example, as you move
21 and progress throughout a run and you move upstream, perhaps,
22 if you're targeting one or multiple fish, somebody's standing
23 right on top of you and basically, effectively prohibiting
24 your motion upstream, so you would have to jump out and
25 disrupt your--your experience and find the next available
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2      Q    So if I understand your testimony, you're fishing to
3 a fish or a run from below and somebody comes in at the top of
4 the run and comes down on you and fishes down on that same
5 run?  Is that what I'm hearing?
6      A    That is, yeah, that would be the definition of high
7 holing, being high holed.
8      Q    Right.  And you had a good or preferred fishing
9 experiences on waters like that in Utah where you've had--
10 you've had other anglers on the water but you've been able to
11 accommodate each other and have a--a good experience?
12      A    In the past.  In the past.
13      Q    Well, let's talk about those in the past.  What do
14 you mean by the past?
15      A    I would--I would say around five, six years ago, 
16 pre--pre H.B. 141.
17      Q    And where did you have those types of experiences
18 or that experience?
19      A    I had that experience on, I remember in particular
20 on the Middle Provo.  I've had--
21      Q    And where is the Middle Provo?
22      A    The Middle Provo is between Jordanelle Reservoir and
23 Deer Creek Reservoir.
24      Q    I'm going to show you what's been marked and
25 stipulated as being admitted Exhibit 3.1.  If you could--
2956





1      A    Yeah.
2      Q    --if you could, just point out for the Court where
3 the Middle Provo is?
4      A    So here's Jordanelle Reservoir right here, Deer
5 Creek right there and the Middle Provo flows from Jordanelle
6 down here.
7      Q    Okay.  (Inaudible)  And you said you had one or more
8 experiences where you were dealing with other anglers, where
9 there were other anglers fishing the water, but you were still
10 able back prior to H.B. 141 to have a good fishing experience?
11      A    Yeah.  Yeah.  I was.
12      Q    And how did you go about having a good fishing 
13 experience if there were other anglers there?
14      A    Well, I was able to move away from them, for one, I
15 mean, I'm a relatively young guy, able guy and so I can go for
16 a walk, I had more time available at that time, too, to be
17 able to go for a walk.  And--and what the Middle Provo offered
18 at that time, that was more--more akin to what I was looking
19 for in my angling experience in that period of my development
20 as an angler.
21      Q    Do you ever leap frog fishing runs or holes while
22 you're fishing a stream?
23      A    Sometimes you have to, but it's not really preferred
24 etiquette because then if somebody jumps right in in front of
25 you and then you do the same thing back to them, you just end
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1 up in a cycle of deep frogging reciprocity and--
2      Q    When you're on the Middle Provo, for example, are
3 there any distractions down there other than perhaps other
4 anglers and wildlife, the natural experience?  Is there a
5 highway, for example?
6      A    On the Middle?
7      Q    Right.
8      A    No.  I mean, there--there is a highway but it's a
9 ways away, it's not right up against the river.
10      Q    And so you don't hear it?
11      A    No.
12      Q    Okay. 
13      A    There are some houses that are now popping up, but
14 they don't generally detract from the experience.
15      Q    Okay.  So when do you go fishing?
16      A    When I have time.
17      Q    Has that changed over time?
18      A    The amount of time I have to go fishing?
19      Q    Yes.
20      A    Yes, it has.
21      Q    Because?
22      A    Now, I mean, I have--from when--when I was able to 
23 go fish in my younger days, now, I mean, I have more demands,
24 academic demands, I have a wife, I have family, life generally
25 more busy.
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1      Q    Okay.
2      A    So time is more limited.
3      Q    But before you had these other obligations or
4 privileges, however you might view them, were you able to go
5 further, if you will, to find a place to fish or go more often
6 or--
7      A    I was able to go more often.  You know, I would
8 generally say that even when--even in--and I'm thinking in
9 the--in this pre-H.B. 141 era, when notably, I was fishing
10 more than I am right now, I wouldn't necessarily have to go
11 further.  I could still use the same amount of time, it just
12 seems that now--now my time is limited for other, various
13 reasons.
14      Q    And--and am I to understand that you can't find the
15 experience you once had on the Middle Provo, by example, now
16 that you used to previously?
17      A    No.  I--I've rarely if ever fished the Middle Provo
18 anymore.
19      Q    Okay.
20      A    I think I've fished the Middle Provo once in the
21 past year versus a dozen or a couple dozen times.
22      Q    Let's talk for a few minutes about Stream Access
23 and in particular, about H.B. 141.
24      A    Okay.
25      Q    You're president of the Stream Access Coalition, 
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1 have been for a couple years and have been a member for--for
2 five years.
3      A    That's correct.
4      Q    Are you familiar with H.B. 141?
5      A    I am familiar with H.B. 141.
6      Q    And what is your understanding of what H.B. 141
7 does?
8      A    It restricts the public's ability to recreate on
9 waterways, on rivers and streams where they flow over private
10 property unless you have express written landowner permission
11 or you are floating through.
12      Q    Okay.  You could also be able to fish that type of
13 water if there--it was walk-in access of old; is that right?
14      A    That's correct.
15      Q    Or an easement or something like that?
16      A    That's correct.
17      Q    Okay.  
18           MR. THOMAS:  Objection on that one, your Honor. 
19 Leading.
20           THE COURT:  Sustained.
21      Q    (By Mr. Coburn)  Are you familiar with walk-in 
22 access?
23      A    I am familiar with walk-in access.
24      Q    And what is your understanding of walk-in access?
25      A    That it is a negotiated agreement between the State
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1 and private property owners that allow access across their
2 property to the streambed on their property that they may join
3 in or opt out of as they please.
4      Q    So by virtue of the walk-in access agreement, you're
5 allowed to fish waters that traverse private beds?
6           MR. THOMAS:  Foundation, your Honor.
7           THE COURT:  Where is the foundation lacking?
8           MR. THOMAS:  I don't know how he knows all of these 
9 things about walk-in access agreement, whether he's ever seen
10 one, whether he's executed one, whether he's been party to
11 one, yet, he's testifying as to the content and as to the
12 legal merits of the agreement.
13           THE COURT:  Sustained.
14           Lay additional foundation.
15      Q    (By Mr. Coburn)  Have you ever fished walk-in
16 access?
17      A    Many times.
18      Q    Okay.  Where?
19      A    Predominantly on the Weber River between Rockport
20 and Echo.
21      Q    Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 3.3.
22 Would you point out for the Court the walk-in access section
23 of the Weber River that you've just told the Court that you've
24 fished.
25      A    The specific?
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1      Q    Or no, the--the stretch--
2      A    Or the reach of the river.
3      Q    The reach of the river.
4      A    All right.  So here's--here's Wanship, here's
5 Rockport Reservoir that I mentioned and then--and then it
6 flows goes down to Coalville, and Echo's down here.
7      Q    Okay.  (Inaudible)
8      A    Right here through here.
9      Q    Okay.  And I noticed the coloring on this particular
10 map, you see part of that stretch is red, there's a little
11 piece of yellow and some of it's magenta.
12      A    Yes.
13      Q    Okay.  And what's the magenta, I mean, at least
14 according to this map?
15      A    Secured access on private land.
16      Q    And what is your understanding of what that means, 
17 having fished walk-in access areas between the Provo and
18 Wanship?
19      A    That that is likely walk-in access on--in that
20 stretch.
21      Q    Okay.  You mentioned H.B. 141 allows floating.
22      A    It does.
23      Q    Floating of waters that traverse private beds?
24      A    Yes.  As long as you don't stop or impede your
25 downstream progress.
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1      Q    Can you touch the bed?
2      A    That's not my understanding.  You cannot touch the
3 bed.
4      Q    For any reason?
5      A    Well, unless you need to safely portage around an
6 obstacle, for example, then you can touch the bed.
7      Q    Okay.  Are you familiar with Utah's trespass laws?
8 And let me--let me preface that question with, you do
9 understand that H.B. 141 talks about private property as to
10 which access is restricted; correct?
11      A    Correct.
12      Q    Okay.  What's your understanding of Utah's trespass
13 laws in that context?
14      A    That if you access a river, one of these H.B. 141
15 waters that traverse private property and you touch the beds,
16 that you are subject to Utah's trespass laws.
17      Q    Okay.  Do you have an understanding of the phrase
18 private property as to which access is restricted?
19      A    Yes.  I do.
20      Q    And what is that understanding?
21      A    My understanding would be, I mean, the most obvious
22 example would be if there is a fence around private property
23 that says private property, no trespassing, then that's
24 private property to which access is restricted.  But then
25 there's other parts of the law that discuss cultivated lands
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1 and I apologize, I don't remember the exact wording, but land
2 that looks like it could be cultivated or land that looks like
3 it is designed to keep people out.
4      Q    Land that's designed?
5      A    Excuse me, a fence, fenced property that looks like 
6 that it is--the access is restricted or it is fenced then to
7 keep people out or keep livestock in.
8      Q    Okay. 
9      A    I generally err on the side that property,
10 especially in this region of the State, is private, unless I
11 specifically know otherwise.
12      Q    And how might you know specifically otherwise?
13      A    If, say, for example, I've crossed the Forest
14 Service boundary.
15      Q    Okay.
16      A    Or I know that I'm on public land, I--I know from
17 looking up this specific area that I'm going in advance,
18 perhaps, that it's public property where I'm going.
19      Q    Okay.
20      A    Or I've crossed the walk-in access ladders and know
21 that it's still private property but I'm--
22      Q    Have you ever sought and secured landowner
23 permission to fish a stream on that individual's property?
24      A    Yes.  I have.
25      Q    And where--where was that?
2964





1      A    That was on the Upper Weber up above Rockport
2 Reservoir.
3      Q    Let's go back to that exhibit and can you point out
4 where that is?  Again, we're looking at Exhibit 3.3.
5      A    Okay.  So we see the Weber River as its course
6 right here, here's where I was discussing the walk-in access
7 before and the Weber's flowing in this direction, so upstream
8 of Wanship, upstream of Rockport is this region of the Weber
9 right here and it goes up towards Kamas and Peoa.  And that's
10 where I've secured--had secured access.
11      Q    You say you had secured access there.  First of all,
12 who's the landowner?
13      A    A gentleman has the name of Lloyd Marchant.
14      Q    Okay.
15      A    I believe is the principal of the school up there
16 and a very nice man.
17      Q    Okay.  And he allowed you to access the Weber and
18 his section of the Weber there from his property?
19      A    He did.  He let us park on the road there and then
20 cross his property to access the river and then once we were
21 in the river, move upstream or downstream.
22      Q    And what time period are we talking about?
23      A    We are talking about the Conatser window, this 2008-
24 2009, pre-May 2010, and then a little while thereafter, he
25 would allow me to fish the stretch of river that he actually
2965





1 had--that actually crossed his property.  But unfortunately,
2 due to some family disputes, he was no longer able to allow me
3 to access that stretch of river.
4      Q    Okay.  It--
5      A    He lost that property.
6      Q    --it was private property as to what access--as to
7 which access was restricted?
8      A    That's correct.
9      Q    Okay.  So you haven't been back there since?
10      A    I wish I had.
11      Q    Why?
12      A    That's exceptionally good trout fishing.  And it's
13 exactly the reason why--I mean, it falls in line with all the
14 reasons why I fly fish; the solitude, the experience, the
15 wildlife, the river, the fish, the character of the river and
16 stream.  The type of angling that I can do there.
17      Q    Okay.  Let me--let me explore a little bit more of
18 this notion that H.B. 141 allows floating.  And you explained
19 your understanding of what that means to you.  And there's--
20 and I know you've heard this in the debates over the years,
21 well, you can still float and fish these waters; correct? 
22 You've heard that?
23      A    I've heard that.
24      Q    Right.  You're smiling.  Why are you smiling?
25      A    That's an absurd notion.
2966





1           Why?
2      A    So, I have floated and fished many times in the
3 past, we mentioned the Green River--or you mentioned the Green
4 River where that's actual--actually possible to do.  It
5 requires a certain depth to the river, it requires a certain
6 flow to the river.  And in these water craft that you would
7 use to do that, your feet are typically dangling below the
8 water as we--we talked about drifts and being able to present
9 the fly in a way that is natural and convincing for the fish. 
10 And if you--you can't use oars, obviously, because you're 
11 casting at the same time, so the only way to control your
12 speed downstream is by kicking with your fins.
13           And with the exception of the Green River, I can't
14 think of another river in the State where it is possible to do
15 that and angle at the same time.
16      Q    For trout?
17      A    For trout.  Right.  Yes.
18      Q    So--
19      A    And then there's an additional problem, once you
20 actually hook into a--a trout, you can't stop to land the
21 trout and while it's feasible on the Green where you're--you
22 are able to kick and you know, stay away from obstacles, it's
23 sufficiently wide and deep, et cetera, in some of these small
24 streams, even if you were to be able to float down them, to be
25 able to fight and land a fish is going to be practically
2967






2      Q    So where--what--what waters are you familiar with
3 other than the Green River where float fishing as allowed
4 theoretically by H.B. 141 would be practically impossible?
5      A    Let--let me just, so I hear you correctly, where
6 float fishing is practically impossible under--
7      Q    Under--
8      A    Within the confines on H.B. 141?
9      Q    Yeah.  On the rivers that you're familiar with, what
10 rivers are you talking about?
11      A    I'm talking about the Upper Weber, I'm talking
12 about the Middle Weber, those two stretches that I just
13 mentioned, I'm talking about the Upper Provo, which flows
14 through Victory Ranch.  Those are the--the examples that I'm
15 most familiar with.
16      Q    And what about the Middle Provo?
17      A    You--I mean, I guess you could float the Middle
18 Provo, but--but that's impractical, for a number of other
19 reasons, not including the fact that you'll have--you have so
20 many people that you'll be floating through.
21      Q    Well, you can float the--the Middle Provo,
22 theoretically, and fish at the same time because it's public.
23      A    You could.
24      Q    Okay.  So let's talk about the Provo River a little
25 more.
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1           THE COURT:  Counsel, would now be a good time to
2 break?  It's five to 12:00.
3           MR. COBURN:  It's fine with me, I'm--
4           THE COURT:  If we're moving on to a different topic
5 or--
6           MR. COBURN:  I am.  I'm going to start getting into
7 the meat of these witness' testimony and just for the
8 edification of both yourself and counsel, I don't intend to go
9 through in detail with the subsequent witnesses all the
10 nuances of the sport and the love of the sport, but I wanted
11 the Court to get a feel for that.
12           THE COURT:  Okay.
13           MR. COBURN:  So--
14           THE COURT:  Great.  I--I'm just asking the question,
15 I'm not suggesting we need to break now, but if it's a good
16 time, we can.
17           MR. COBURN:  This is a good time, your Honor.
18           THE COURT:  Okay.  All right.
19           Court's in recess.
20           (Recess)
21           THE COURT:  We'll go back on the record in the
22 matter of Utah Stream Access vs. VR Acquisitions, the parties
23 are present.
24           Mr. Olson, if you'd re-take the witness stand.
25           THE WITNESS:  Thank you, your Honor.
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1           THE COURT:  Counsel, you may proceed.
2           MR. COBURN:  Thank you, your Honor. 
3      Q    (By Mr. Coburn)  Mr. Olson, before we broke for 
4 lunch, we were just starting to explore the Provo River a
5 little more and you mentioned this morning that you had fished
6 the Provo River; correct?
7      A    That's correct.
8      Q    And I believe you mentioned specifically the middle
9 section of the Provo between Jordanelle and Deer Creek.
10      A    That's correct.
11      Q    Okay.  Have you--have you fished other sections of
12 the Provo?
13      A    I have.  I have fished the Upper Provo and the Lower
14 Provo sections both.
15      Q    Okay.
16           MR. COBURN:  Your Honor, I--I realized when I got
17 out of here that I had never asked you for permission to
18 approach the witness.
19           Permission to approach.
20           THE COURT:  You're good.
21           MR. COBURN:  Thank you, your Honor.
22           THE COURT:  Thank you.
23      Q    (By Mr. Coburn)  Would you point out for Judge
24 Pullan where the lower section of the Provo is that you've 
25 fished?
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1      A    So the lower section of the Provo flows out of
2 Deer Creek Reservoir right here.
3      Q    Okay.
4      A    And eventually makes its way down into Orem, into
5 Provo and terminates in Utah Lake, but the section where most
6 of the fishing happens is--is this upper reach and the canyon
7 below Timpanogos.
8           MR. THOMAS:  Your Honor, may I just inquire, when
9 they have the map app, would you have an objection to us
10 coming up and--
11           THE COURT:  Yeah.  Come on up so everyone can see.
12           THE WITNESS:  Would you like me to go through that
13 again?
14           THE COURT:  Yeah.  One more--one more time.
15           THE CLERK:  And talk just a little bit louder when
16 you're aware from the mike.
17           THE COURT:  Okay.
18           THE WITNESS:  Okay.  So the Lower Provo that we're
19 talking about right here flows out of Deer Creek Reservoir,
20 down through the canyon, past Mt. Timpanogos here, into Orem
21 and down into Utah Lake and the region that we're focusing on
22 where I've done the most angling is in this stretch from Mt.
23 Timpanogos up to Deer Creek.
24           THE COURT:  Okay.
25      Q    (By Mr. Coburn)_  And what about the--do you fish
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1 the Upper Provo exclusive of Victory Ranch for now?
2      A    The only place that I have fished the Upper Provo
3 exclusive of Victory Ranch is--is up very high on Forest
4 Service land and I would have a difficult time pointing out
5 exactly where that is up on the map, probably somewhere up
6 here, I would--I would guess.
7      Q    Okay.  And where, since we have this map up here so
8 the Judge can identify, where is the Victory Ranch section of
9 the Upper Provo? 
10      A    So the Victory Ranch section of the Upper Provo,
11 you'll see, I'll just kinda walk you upstream from the
12 Jordanelle Reservoir, your Honor, okay, so you have this
13 little yellow section right here that is Rockport State Park
14 and then it crosses--or actually, I should say before it hits
15 the bridge with State Road 32, it becomes Victory Ranch and
16 then Victory Ranch is the next four or so miles upstream from
17 there.  So generally in this area.
18      Q    Thank you.  So let's talk about the Lower Provo.
19 You say you have fished the Lower Provo?
20      A    I have.
21      Q    You fished it prior to 2--May, 2010?
22      A    Yes.  I have.
23      Q    And how many times?
24      A    Only a couple of times prior to May, 2010.
25      Q    And do you recall as you sit here, what year or
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1 years those were?
2      A    I want to say 2009 would be the first time I
3 fished it.
4      Q    Okay.
5      A    Yeah.
6      Q    And the next time you fished it prior to May, 2010,
7 would that have also been in 2009?
8      A    That also would have been in 2009.
9      Q    Okay.  Is there anything about either of those
10 occasions fishing the Lower Provo that stands out in your
11 mind?
12      A    Yeah.  I mean, it's--pardon me, it's the general
13 things that I think about the Lower Provo right now that's
14 somewhat inconsistent with my preferred fishing experience. 
15 There's a highway right there, it's generally loud, road
16 noise, there's a lot of--a lot of signs warning and making
17 various suggestions about private property and whether you
18 will or will not be fined by fishing in certain areas.
19           The first time I fished it, I remember it was in
20 summer and there was a large amount of tubers, inner tube--
21 inner tubers floating down the river on various--their inner
22 tubes or inflatable mattresses or what have you, so it wasn't
23 the most conducive to an enjoyable fishing experience for me.
24      Q    Just as a general proposition, how wide is the
25 Provo in this section, the Lower Provo in this section between
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1 Deer Creek and Timpanogos?
2      A    Oh, you know, I wouldn't say--I wouldn't say it's
3 much wider than maybe from where you're standing to those back
4 row of windows.  It's--it's relatively narrow in that stretch.
5      Q    And it gets narrower or wider in spots, but that's
6 an average?
7      A    I would say that's fair, yeah.
8      Q    Okay.  And so how did the--the presence of the
9 tubers, were they quiet and respectful as they came through?
10      A    Some--well, they all wanted to know, they're all
11 very interested in knowing how the fishing had been as they
12 float over, but you can imagine standing where you are, Mr.
13 Coburn, and--and making a cast, you know, with a nine-foot
14 long rod and a 30-foot long cast that at this point, you're
15 already covering a large swath of the river so it makes it--
16 makes it very difficult to effectively fish with lots of inner
17 tubes coming through or waves of inner tubes coming through.
18           So your two experiences prior to May, 2010, fishing
19 on the Lower Provo, at least this one was, didn't meet
20 expectations or at least what you hoped for in terms of a
21 preferred angling experience?
22      A    That's correct.  This one didn't.
23           And the other experience, I remember going back
24 later in the fall and it was very--I will give it this, it was
25 very beautiful with the colors on Mt. Timpanogos, and I
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1 remember low clouds and--and it was very pretty.  Less tubers
2 that time, but again, you know, the--the road noise, the
3 traffic, those things were detracting from the experience and
4 the presence of signs of--
5      Q    Okay.  What about other anglers?
6      A    There were quite a few, number of other anglers.
7 Actually, I was relatively inexperienced fishing the Lower
8 Provo and that's one of the ways that I knew where I could go
9 or where an access was, was the presence of cars pulled off on
10 the side of the road; but unfortunately, when I get packed
11 down there to the river, there was a good number of anglers
12 down there fishing as well.
13      Q    Were you able to find a run or runs to fish?
14      A    I think I might have found one, but nothing
15 remarkably stands out that is really--I don't have a good, I
16 don't have a memory of the Lower Provo in general that draws
17 me to come back to that spot.
18      Q    Okay.  Did you fish the Lower Provo after May 20th,
19 2010?
20      A    Yes.
21      Q    On how many occasions?  That would be from May,
22 2010, to today?
23      A    Again, I would say I--I bet I can count it on--
24 count them on both hands.
25      Q    Okay.  So--
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1      A    So six times, maybe.
2      Q    Okay.
3      A    I'd say.
4      Q    Do any of those particular experiences on the 
5 Middle Provo--strike that, the Lower Provo, following May,
6 2010, stand out in your mind?
7      A    Unfortunately for the same reasons as before,
8 there's times when I've gone there and I had--I have had one
9 good day fishing that I recall right now, that was--I believe
10 in March, a couple years back.  And it was--it was decent
11 fishing, small, little mayflies on the surface; but again,
12 there was--I was--I remember going there and being surprised
13 because I was there about the noon hour which is when this
14 hatch typically happens and surprised at how many people I saw
15 on the river.  I think I probably made a comment to the
16 partner I was fishing with, something to the effect of, don't
17 these people have jobs, or something like that.  Because I
18 was--I was really surprised how many people were there in the
19 middle of the day.
20      Q    You've mentioned that unfortunately some of your
21 other experiences, other than the one that you just spoke to
22 on the Lower Provo compare somewhat to the ones you had prior
23 to May, 2010.  Is that the tubers you're referring to or--
24      A    Yes.
25      Q    Anything else?
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1      A    They--I mean, there were people prior to May, 2010,
2 there seemed to be more crowding after that point.  The
3 quality of the fish, that seemed--what seemed somewhat
4 similar.  There was definitely--seems to be more--more signs. 
5 I mean, the thing--the thing that becomes difficult with going
6 down and fishing some of these areas when there is signage all
7 over the place about, you may or may not be trespassing and
8 this sort of thing, is it makes me very nervous and uneasy as
9 a angler and a law-abiding citizen whether or not I even want
10 to go there.  And when I start adding all these things up, it
11 doesn't make for a very good angling experience, certainly not
12 a preferred angling experience.
13      Q    You mentioned quality of fish.  You said the quality
14 of the fish was about the same.  Did I hear you correctly?
15      A    Between before May, 2010, and on the two occasions
16 that I fished there, I--I didn't do particularly well, but I
17 do remember the fish that I caught seemed--
18      Q    Okay.
19      A    But that's a very small sample size, I should say.
20      Q    But--but I want to make sure the record is clear
21 here.  Did you testify in--with regards to the quality of the
22 fish after May, 2010, versus before May, 2010?
23      A    With the quality of the fish that were actually
24 there--
25      Q    Right.
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1      A    --in the river?
2      Q    Right.
3      A    For that, again, very small sample size that I'd
4 seen, the--it seemed--they seemed somewhat similar; but again,
5 I mean, we're talking two, three fish before May, 2010.
6      Q    Okay.  How would you compare your experience angling
7 on the Lower Provo prior to May, 2010, to after May, 2010?
8      A    Again, none of the times really were that great of
9 an angling experience for me.  You know, the--perhaps--yeah, I
10 would just say that none--none of those angling experiences
11 particularly stand out in my head as a particularly fulfilling
12 or--or angling experience that drives me to go back.
13      Q    What about the number of anglers that you saw prior
14 to May, 2010, versus after May, 2010?
15      A    There's definitely more after May, 2010.  And I'm
16 thinking particularly of a--of a stretch of the Provo--of the
17 Upper Provo--or sorry, excuse me, the Lower Provo River on the
18 upper section of the Lower Provo River, which then, I know
19 used to receive a fair bit of angling pressure and did not
20 anymore and I think that's because it had something to do with
21 the no trespassing signs that were posted all around it.
22      Q    Okay.  How would you compare it--well, let--let me 
23 ask this first for foundation purposes:  When was the last
24 time you fished the Lower Provo?
25      A    Successfully fished?  Or attempted to fish the Lower
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2      Q    Well, let's talk about successfully fished, first?
3      A    The last time I successfully fished the Lower 
4 Provo would have been that occasion a couple years ago.
5      Q    And what do you mean by successfully fished at 
6 that--on that occasion?
7      A    I got--arrived at the river, the flows looked good,
8 the weather looked favorable, donned the waders, went down,
9 encountered a hatch, made casts, caught fish.
10      Q    Okay.  But again, there were more anglers than
11 previously?
12      A    Yes.
13           MR. THOMAS:  Objection.  Leading.
14           THE COURT:  Sustained.
15      Q    (By Mr. Coburn)  Then you mentioned--you asked me
16 whether I meant successfully fished the Lower Provo or
17 attempted to fish the Lower Provo.  What did you mean by
18 attempted to fish the Lower Provo?
19      A    The--actually the most recent time I went to the
20 Lower Provo, I arrived there to find that the flows were low,
21 the wind was fierce and there were still some people that were
22 going out and fishing but it was not something that I
23 preferred to do at that point.
24      Q    So am I to understand, is the Court to understand
25 that the last time you successfully fished the Lower Provo was
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2      A    I think that is accurate.  I would say March, 2013,
3 yes.
4      Q    Okay.  Did you notice any change in the Lower Provo
5 and--and your fishing experience between May, 2010, and March,
6 2013?
7      A    Every time, again, as I mentioned, that there is--
8 apart from the issue of--of tubers, it is a very heavily used
9 river.  And while that bar is already set for high use, I
10 would say in that time period, each time that I would go
11 there, I would see more people.  I think that that is a--that
12 is a trend, that it is increasing in--in use.
13      Q    Okay.  And did that include in March, 2013?  ‘Cause
14 you--I'm assuming that March, 2013, there weren't any real
15 brave tubers?
16      A    There were not brave tubers in March, 2013, no, but
17 there were people and I think what ended up allowing me to
18 have that--that decent angling experience that I described is,
19 although there were people above and below me, I happened to
20 be in the right spot at the right time and lucked into it, I
21 guess.
22      Q    Okay.  Now, let's talk about the Middle Provo,
23 which is between Deer Creek and Jordanelle.  Had you fished
24 the Middle Provo prior to May, 2010?
25      A    Yes.
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1 anglers at the Henry's Fork in Idaho; is that correct?
2      A    That is--that is correct.
3      Q    And the difference was better etiquette of the
4 anglers; correct?
5      A    There's a number of differences between the Middle
6 Provo and the Henry's Fork in Idaho.  Vast, vast number of
7 differences.
8      Q    What you testified to earlier was that it was the
9 etiquette of the anglers who won't skip ahead and take holes
10 or jump downstream from you; correct?
11      A    That was part of the testimony.
12      Q    Okay.
13      A    I would say that--
14      Q    So you might have a better time on the Middle Provo
15 if people behaved better?
16      A    I also might have a better time on the Middle Provo
17 if it had large rainbow trout that appreciated eating dry
18 flies and was a very wide, slow meandering river.
19      Q    Okay.  You talked about part of your experience
20 fishing on the Lower Provo that you don't enjoy is the tubers;
21 correct?
22      A    I--I do not particularly enjoy--I do enjoy tubing
23 but I do not enjoy being floated over while I'm trying to fly
24 fish.
25      Q    And you testified that part of the reason you don't
3055





1 enjoy flat water is because of the boats and the wakes and the
2 other motorized vehicles that are on the water; is that
3 correct?
4      A    Those are some of the reasons that I testified to,
5 yes.
6      Q    And because of the bait.  You said that, didn't
7 you?
8      A    I was referring to trash left behind, not
9 necessarily bait itself.
10      Q    But the bait fisherman is enjoying the water;
11 correct?
12      A    Yes.
13      Q    Recreating on the water.  And the boater is
14 recreating on the water; right?
15      A    That is correct.
16      Q    And the tubers are recreating on the water.
17      A    They are.
18      Q    Okay.  I believe you testified with respect to the
19 Middle Strawberry that before H.B. 141, you fished there on
20 approximately two occasions; is that correct?
21      A    Yes.
22      Q    And since H.B. 141, you've fished there 20 to 25
23 times; is that correct?
24      A    Yes.  That's correct.
25      Q    So despite the fact that you find it a less
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1 enjoyable experience, you continue to go back and in fact,
2 have gone back significantly more times?
3      A    I am limited with places where I can go.
4      Q    And those two occasions out of the 25 occasions that
5 you've been up there, you haven't had a good time on two of
6 those occasions?
7           You've been up there 25 times since Conatser.
8      A    Yes. 
9      Q    Have you had two good experiences in those 25
10 occasions?
11      A    I've had two good experiences in those 25 occasions
12 since I've been up there.
13      Q    But using your--comparing the 25 times you've been
14 up now to the two times you were up there before; correct?
15      A    What I am comparing are not two distinct points. 
16 I'm comparing a trend.
17      Q    And on the Lower Provo, you testified that you
18 fished there twice before Conatser; correct? 
19      A    That's correct.
20           And you fished there six times after Conatser;
21 correct?
22      A    That's--yes.
23      Q    And you've--on the Middle Provo, you testified that
24 you fished there ten times before and you testi--and fished
25 there 50 times since; is that correct?
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1           MR. COBURN:  I'm going to object to that.  I think
2 that's misstating the witness' testimony.  I think those cut-
3 off points were with H.B. 141, not Conatser.
4           MR. THOMAS:  I'm sorry.  He's right.  He's correct. 
5 I'm--I--
6           THE COURT:  Sustained.
7           MR. THOMAS:  That would be correct.
8      Q    (By Mr. Thomas)  With respect--
9      A    I was with you.   
10      Q    We--we understand each other.
11           So on the Lower Provo, you testified that you 
12 fished there twice before H.B. 141 and six times after.
13      A    That's correct.
14      Q    With respect to the Middle Provo, you testified
15 that you fished there ten times before and 50 times after?
16      A    Roughly speaking with those numbers, yes.
17      Q    And with Strawberry below Starvation, I believe
18 we've already talked about that.
19      A    Yes.  We haven.
20      Q    Weber, between Wanship and Coalville, I believe you
21 said before 2010, you fished there once and pos-2010, you
22 fished there 20 to 30 times?
23      A    Yes.
24      Q    And Rockport to Echo on the Weber, before 2010, you
25 fished there one to two times and after, you fished 50 times;
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1 is that correct?
2      A    Yes.
3      Q    Okay.  So that means post-2010, we have 50 times on
4 Rockport to Echo, we'll go low, 20 on Wanship to Coalville--
5      A    That's the same stretch of river.  The Weber,
6 Rockport to Echo and Wanship to Coalville.
7      Q    Okay.  So a total of 50 times there?
8      A    Yes.
9      Q    Okay.  And then 20 to 25 times on Strawberry?
10      A    Yeah.
11      Q    Seventy-five times, total.  And then 50 times on
12 the Middle?
13      A    Yeah.
14      Q    A hundred and twenty-five times?
15      A    Yeah.
16      Q    Now, on the Lower Provo, six times?
17      A    Yeah.
18      Q    So that would have been 131 times in the last five
19 years?
20      A    Yeah.
21      Q    A lot of fishing for someone who's in school, isn't
22 it?
23      A    Well, I'll tell you, in five years, that spreads out
24 a lot.  And the other thing is, when you--a time going fishing
25 isn't necessarily a time.  You look at the days where you go
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1 to the Strawberry, for example, where it requires to take an
2 entire day versus comparing that to, say, the Middle Provo
3 where I could run up in an evening.
4      Q    Do you know how long it would take somebody from
5 Cedar City to get to Strawberry?
6      A    I don't have the foggiest; five hours?  Four? 
7 Three?  I--I don't know.
8      Q    There are always some places you're not going to be
9 able to go because you can't access them; right?  Because
10 they--it's too snowy, for example?
11      A    Snowy does preclude access to some places.
12      Q    Some people aren't going to be able to access every
13 stretch of the river because they're not physically capable;
14 correct?
15      A    That is correct.
16      Q    And sometimes, anglers can't fish particular sets
17 of streams--parts of streams because they prefer bait fishing;
18 correct?
19      A    Certainly.
20      Q    You talked a lot about your preferred angling.  What
21 was the phrase you were using?
22      A    My preferred angling experience?
23      Q    Preferred angling experience.
24           I'd like to run through some of the factors on that.
25           Is it correct that your preferred angling experience
3060





1 would not involve tubers or boaters or bait trash lying
2 around?
3      A    Well, sometimes I will float on a boat and that's
4 part of my preferred angling experience, but--
5      Q    That's not what you testified.  But you testified
6 that all those things would be factors in a preferred angling
7 experience, did you not?
8      A    I--I testified that those things detract from my
9 preferred angling experience.
10      Q    And not too many people; correct?
11      A    That's correct.
12      Q    And in fact, you want a place where somebody hasn't
13 been there in the last hour; correct?
14      A    Well, it depends on if I'm trying to catch a fish
15 right there or not.
16      Q    Well, I know, but didn't you--didn't you tell us
17 earlier that you want to make sure--you want to go places
18 where you can--people haven't been, to--what was the--what was
19 the phrase you used?
20      A    Put the fish down.
21      Q    Put the fish down.  Right.
22      A    It is--it is helpful for successful angling if
23 that's what you're going for, that you fish somewhere where
24 fish haven't been put down, yes.
25      Q    So what you, in an ideal world, would like is
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     Q    Would you please explain those?
     A    Sure.  When I started guiding and we would do a trip
on the Middle Provo in 2005, you could meet your client at
8:30, 8:00-8:30, build a good rapport with them, slowly drive
down the river, get into a parking lot that you wanted to
fish, get onto the river, start fishing, you could go from
hole to hole and fish different water.
          Now, in--in this year, we usually meet our clients
at around 6:00, 6:30, we race to the river and we, you know,
get out in the parking lot, we try to hustle them to get to
the river and usually when we get on a spot to fish it, we do
not move.
     Q    Why not?
     A    If--if we moved, a lot of times, on a typical--
typical day on the Middle Provo, there's a good chance we're
not going to find another spot to fish.
     Q    Did you say that was on what section of the Provo?
     A    The middle, the middle section of the Provo.
     Q    What about the Lower Provo?
     A    The Lower Provo, we find the--the same thing, that
it--that it's difficult to move spots.  And I--I typically
don't guide as much on the Lower Provo in the summertime.
     Q    Because?
     A    In the past few years, the--the tubers that have 
been floating down the river have kind of ruined what I
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     Q    And that regulation change would have allowed bait
fishermen on the entire stretch of the Middle Provo?
     A    Two miles--
     Q    Okay.
     A    --worth.
     Q    Two miles.
     A    ‘Cause prior to that, it was not, it was artificial
fly and lure only.
     Q    Okay.  Was there any opposition to that effort to
change those two miles to allow bait fishing?
     A    There was some, yes.
     Q    Where did that opposition come from?
     A    From anglers, from angling organizations, just
people that have specific preferences for the type of fishing
that they want to do.
     Q    What type of preferences?
     A    Primarily fly fishing.
     Q    So the--at least one segment of the fly fishing
community opposed allowing bait fishing on a two-mile stretch
of the Provo to conduct this study?
     A    Correct.  There were some perceptions there that too
many fish would be removed or opportunities would be lost, et
cetera, et cetera.
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own interpretation of the Utah Code and its prior precedent, not on the Utah 
Constitution_ Ed. 11 8-19. 
Following Conatser, the legislature chose to address the balance struck by 
this court between legislatively grounded recreational user rights and landowner 
rights to the private beds of non-navigable public waters. In choosing to define 
legislatively the scope of the public right to use public waters recreationally, the 
legislature noted a number of problems arising after Conatser, such as 
"widespread unauthorized invasion of private property for recreation purposes." 
Utah Code § 73-29-103(2). In its deliberations, the legislature considered itself to 
be weighing the rights of the public in public waters, under Article XX, Section 1, 
and the rights of owners of private beds underlying public waters not to have 
their property "taken or damaged for public use without just compensation," 
under Article I, Section 22. Recognizing that the balancing of those rights is 
difficult, the legislature judged HB 141 to be a reasonable compromise on a 
"difficult, intricate, and emotional topic." Recording of Utah House Floor 
Debates, FIB 141 First Substitute, 58th Leg., 2010 Gen. Sess. (Feb. 23, 2010) 
(statement of Rep. Sheryl L. Allen). As the sponsor of the bill explained, he tried 
"to draft something that truly would harmonize constitutional protections [of 
private property] with trying to give as much access to the fishermen as we could 
without violating those principles." Id. (statement of Rep. Kay L. McIff). 
6 
HB 141 is the first Utah statute to expressly recognize the public's right to 
use waters recreationally. hi recognizing that right, HB 141 clarified that the 
public's right to recreationally use waters that flow over private property does 
not stein from that part of the Utah Code declaring public ownership of water, 
i.e., the portion of the Code which was first enacted in 1903. Specifically, it states 
that public ownership of water "does not create or recognize an easement for 
public recreational use on private property." Utah Code & 73-1-1(2). Instead, the 
scope of that recreational right is recognized and governed by Chapter 29 of Tide 
73. Id. § 73-1-1(4). 
HB 141 altered the scope of the right to use public waters struck by 
Conatser. Id. § 73-29-103. HB 141 affirms the right to "touch" privately owned 
beds under public waters to allow "safe passage and continued movement" or 
"portage around a dangerous obstruction" while floating public waters. Id. § 73-
29-202(2). But it does not allow the public to remain on the privately owned beds 
unless (1) the owner consents or (ii) the public has so used the particular bed for 
at least 10 consecutive years after 1982. Id. § 73-29-201(2), -202(3), -203(1). 
Otherwise, when property is fenced or posted as private, the public's recreational 
use right does not include touching privately owned beds. Id. § 73-29-102(5). 
The legitimacy of the legislature's concerns about the impact of Cottatser is 
confirmed by evidence presented to the district court in this case. This evidence 
included a number of declarations documenting problems with trespassers, cut 
7 
fences, and litter, as well as resulting dangers to the public.4 Randy Sessions, the 
owner of property along the Weber River in Morgan County, had his fence, 
which crosses the river, cut the Monday after the Conatser opinion was released. 
(R.366). Larry Hays, the owner of residential property along the Millcreek stream 
in Salt Lake City, experienced a surge of people fishing in his backyard after the 
Conatser opinion was published. (12.375) Tim Simonsen, the owner of property 
along the Provo River in Summit County, had his fences cut numerous times. 
(R.371) As a result, his horses left the property and walked onto State Highway 
35. (Id.) Additionally, due to cut fences, a neighbor's cows crossed onto 
Simonsen's property and caused damage. (R.372) Randy James, the owner of 
property on the Smith and Morehouse Creek in Summit County, dealt with 
cleaning up trash and waste from trespassers who camped and started fires on 
his property. (R. 368) James stated that the fence around his property is cut at 
least once a year. (Id.) 
The balance struck by HB 141 between the public right to the recreational 
use of non-navigable public' waters with the rights of owners of the private beds 
beneath them is a reasonable solution reached after careful consideration of 
competing interests. The legislature has not given public property to private 
property owners; it has simply chosen to strike a different balance than this court 
did in Conatser in administering the public's property for the benefit of all. 
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thirty days after its receipt with a statement of 
corrections, amendments or changes required, 
and sixty days shall be allowed for the filing 
thereof. If filed, corrected as required, within 
said time, the application shall, upon being ac-
cepted, take priority as of the date of its origi-
nal receipt, subject to compliance with the further 
requirements of the law and the regulations 
thereunder. Any corrected application filed 
after the time allowed shall be treated in all re-
spects as an original application received on the 
date of its refiling, but no additional filing fee 
shall be required. The date of the return of the 
application, with the reasons therefor, shall be in-
dorsed on the application, and a record made 
thereof in a book kept for recording applications. 
Like entries shall be made of the date when cor-
rected applications are received by the state en-
gineer. Applications for a change of the point of 
diversion, place or nature of use set forth in an 
approved application shall be treated as a cor-
rected application within the meaning of this 
section, but no such change of an approved 
application shall affect the priority of the origi-
nal application; provided, that no change of the 
point of diversion, place or nature of use set 
forth in an approved application shall operate to 
enlarge the time within which the construction 
work shall begin or be completed. 
(L. 19, p. 177, § 45.) 
100-3-6. Id. Notice. 
If not corrected as required, no further pro-
ceedings shall be had on any application, but 
when filed in compliance with this title the state 
engineer shall at once at the expense of the ap-
plicant, to be paid in advance, publish in a news-
paper having general circulation within the 
boundaries of the river system or near the water 
source from which the appropriation is to be 
made a notice of the application showing by 
whom made; the quantity of water sought to be 
appropriated; the stream from which the appro-
priation is to be made and at what point on the 
stream; the use for which it is to be appropriated 
and by what means; which notice shall be pub-
lished at least once a week for a period of four 
weeks. Any change in the proposed point of 
diversion, place or nature of the use of water 
from a stream shall be subject to the approval of 
the state engineer under the provisions of sec- 
tion 100-3-3. 	 (L. 19, p. 177, § 46.) 
100-3-7. Protests. 
Any person interested may, at any time with-
in thirty days after the completion of the publi-
cation of such notice, file with the state engineer 
a written protest against the granting of the ap-
plication, stating the reasons therefor, which 
shall be duly considered by the engineer, and he 
shall approve or reject the application. 
(L. 19, p. 177, § 47.) 
100-3-8. Approval or Rejection by Engineer—
Costs of Inquiry. 
All applications which shall comply with the 
provisions of this chapter and with the regula-
tions of the state engineer's office shall be filed 
and recorded in a suitable book kept for that pur-
pose; and it shall be the duty of the state en-
gineer, upon the payment of the approval fee, to 
approve all applications where the proposed use 
will not impair the value of existing rights, or 
will not interfere with the more beneficial use 
of the water; provided, that where the state en-
gineer, because of information in his possession 
obtained either by his own investigation or other-
wise, has reason to believe that an application to 
appropriate water will interfere with its more 
beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culi-
nary purposes, stock watering, power or mining 
development or manufacturing, or will prove 
detrimental to the public welfare, it shall be his 
duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the 
application until he shall have investigated the 
matter. The cost of such inquiry shall be paid 
by the person making the application, if such ap-
plication is approved; provided, that such charge 
shall not exceed $10 per day and expenses to be 
paid the state engineer or his deputy, and $5 per 
day and expenses for each assistant. Where 
there is no unappropriated water in the proposed 
source of supply, or where the proposed use will 
conflict with prior applications or existing rights, 
or where the approval of such application would 
in the opinion of the state engineer interfere 
with a more beneficial use thereof for irrigation, 
domestic or culinary purposes, stock watering, 
power or mining development or manufacturing, 
or would prove detrimental to the public welfare, 
it shall be the duty of the state engineer to re- 
ject such application. 	 (L. 19, p. 177, § 48.) 
100-3-9. Conflict in Land Areas—Preference 
to Homesteaders, Desert Entrymen 
and Purchasers From State. 
When an application is made to use water on 
certain land and subsequently a homesteader, 
desert entryman, or person in possession of land 
under a contract to purchase the same makes an 
application to appropriate water for use on the 
same land or any part thereof, the latter applica-
tion, on proper showing, may be approved not-
withstanding the conflict in the land areas, and 
the land covered by such subsequent application 
shall thereupon be excluded from such prior ap- 
plication. 	 (L. 19, p. 177, § 49.) 
100-3-10. Approval or Rejection to be Indorsed 
on Application—Time for Com menc-
ing Work. 
The approval or rejection of an application 
shall be indorsed thereon and a record made of 
such indorsement in the state engineer's office. 
The application so indorsed shall be returned to 
the aplicant; if approved, the applicant shall be 
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thirty days after its receipt with a statement of 
corrections, amendments or changes required, 
and sixty days shall be allowed for the filing 
thereof. If filed, corrected as required, within 
said time, the application shall, upon being ac­
cepted, take priority as of the date of its origi­
nal receipt, subject to compliance with the further 
requirements of the law and the regulations 
thereunder. Any corrected application filed 
after the time allowed shall be treated in all re­
spects as an original application received on the 
date of its refiling, but no additional filing fee 
shall be required. The date of the return of the 
application, with the reasons therefor, shall be in­
dorsed on the application, and a record made 
thereof in a book kept for recording applications. 
Like entries shall be made of the date when cor­
rected applications are received by the state en­
gineer. Applications for a change of the point of 
diversion, place or nature of use set forth in an 
approved application shall be treated as a cor­
rected application within the meaning of this 
section, but no such change of an approved 
application shall affect the priority of the origi­
nal application; provided, that no change of the 
point of diversion, place or nature of use set 
forth in an approved application shall operate to 
enlarge the time within which the construction 
work shall begin or be completed.
(L. 19, p. 177, § 45.)
100-3-6. Id. Notice.
If not corrected as required, no further pro­
ceedings shall be had on any application, but 
when filed in compliance with this title the state 
engineer shall at once at the expense of the ap­
plicant, to be paid in advance, publish in a news­
paper having general circulation within the 
boundaries of the river system or near the water 
source from which the appropriation is to be 
made a notice of the application showing by 
whom made; the quantity of water sou ht to be
appropriated; the stream from which the appro­
priation is to be made and at what point on the
stream; t e use for which it is to be appropriated 
and by what means; which notice shall be pub­
lished at least once a week for a period of four 
weeks. Any change in the proposed point of 
diversion, place or nature of the use of water 
from a stream shall be subject to the approval of 
the state engineer under the provisions of sec­
tion 100-3-3. (L. 19, p. 177, § 46.)
100-3-7. Protests.
Any person inter sted may, at a y t me with­
in thirty days after the completion of t publi­
cation of such notice, file with the s ate engineer 
a writte  prot st against the granting of the ap­
plication, stating the reasons therefor, which 
shall be duly considered by the engineer, and he 
shall approve or reject the application.
(L. 19, p. 177, § 47.)
100-3-8. Approval or Rejection by Engineer— 
Costs of Inquiry.
All applications which shall comply with the 
provisions of this chapter and with the regula­
tions of the state engineer’s office shall be filed 
and recorded in a suitable book kept for that pur­
pose; and it shall be the duty of the state en­
gineer, upon the payment of the approval fee, to 
approve all applications where the proposed use 
will not impair the value of existing rights, or 
will not interfere with the more beneficial use 
of the water; provided, that where the state en­
gineer, because of information in his possession 
obtained either by his own investigation or other­
wise, has reason to believe that an application to 
appropriate water will interfere with its more 
beneficial use for irrigation, domestic or culi­
nary purposes, stock watering, power or mining 
development or manufacturing, or will prove 
detrimental to the public welfare, it shall be his 
duty to withhold his approval or rejection of the 
application until he shall have investigated the 
matter. The cost of such inquiry shall be paid 
by the person making the application, if such ap­
plication is approved; provided, that such charge 
shall not exceed $10 per day and expenses to be 
paid the state engineer or his deputy, and $5 per 
day and expenses for each assistant. Where 
there is no unappropriated water in the proposed 
source of supply, or where the proposed use will 
conflict with prior applications or existing rights, 
or where the approval of such application would 
in the opinion of the state engineer interfere 
with a more beneficial use thereof for irrigation, 
domestic or culinary purposes, stock watering, 
power or mining development or manufacturing, 
or would prove detrimental to the public welfare, 
it shall be the duty of the state engineer to re­
ject such application. (L. 19, p. 177, § 48.)
100-3-9. Conflict in Land Areas—Preference 
to Homesteaders, Desert Entrymen 
and Purchasers From State.
When an application is made to use water on 
certai  land and subsequently a homesteader, 
desert entry man, r person in possession of land 
under a contract to purchase the same makes an 
appli ation to appro riate water for use on the 
same land or any part thereof, the latter applica­
tion, on proper showing, may be approved not­
ithstanding th  conflict in the land areas, and 
the land covered by such subsequent application 
shall thereupon be excluded from such prior ap­
plication. (L. 19, p. 177, § 49.)
100-3-10. Approval or Rejection to be Indorsed 
on Application—Time for Commenc­
ing Work.
The approval or rejection of an application 
shall be indorsed thereon and a record made of 
such indorsement in the state engineer’s office. 
The application so indorsed shall be returned to 
the aplicant; if approved, the applicant shall be
